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ARTICLES 
Masking Copyright Decisionmaking: 
The Meaninglessness of Substantial 
Similarity 
Amy B. Cohen* 
Traditionally courts have placed great weight on the issue of substan­
tial similarity in adjudicating copyright infringement lawsuits. Once ac­
cess is proven, a court will usually find infringement if the works are 
viscerally determined to be substantially similar. This Article criticizes 
the traditional approach as failing adequately to distinguish copying 
from misappropriation, failing adequately to distinguish ideas from ex­
pression, failing to provide adequate guidelines for determining misap­
propriation, and as overlapping with fair use determinations. The Arti­
cle also criticizes variations on the traditional approach imposed by the 
Third and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal as not remedying the tradi­
tional approach's fundamental shortcomings. 
The Article proposes replacing the substantial similarity test with fair 
use considerations. Such an approach would force courts to elucidate 
their reasons for determining infringement, and thus would promote con­
sistency and predictability. 
What factors are appropriate to consider in determining whether one 
work infringes the copyright in another work? Assume that one party 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law; J.D., 
Harvard Law School, 1978; B.A., Connecticut College, 197 4. The author wishes to 
express her appreciation to her colleagues, Joseph J. Basile, Jr. and Arthur D. Wolf, 
for the encouragement and helpful comments they provided during the preparation of 
this Article. 
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has obtained a copyright on a stuffed toy cat that has an oversized head 
with oversized purple eyes, large purple ears, a Cheshire grin, and a 
distinctive rainbow plaid fabric covering. 1 Assume also that a second 
manufacturer markets a stuffed toy cat with an ordinary size head and 
ordinary size purple eyes, purple ears, no grin, but the same distinctive 
rainbow plaid fabric covering. In other words, the two works differ in 
head and eye sizes and in the presence of the grin, but use the same 
colors in the eyes, ears, and fabric covering. Does the second cat in­
fringe the copyright in the first? Under current copyright law as devel­
oped in the cases and in the Copyright Act of 197 6, there is no reliable 
way to predict an answer to that question, because neither Congress 
nor the courts have articulated the substantive basis used to determine 
if one work infringes the copyright in another. 
The Copyright Act of 197 6 specifically provides copyright owners 
with a right to sue for infringement.2 It also provides several remedies,3 
but neither the statute nor its legislative history clearly defines the sub­
stantive showing a plaintiff must make to establish that a party has 
infringed the copyright. The statute simply states that anyone who "vi­
olates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by 
sections 106 through 118" is liable for copyright infringement.4 When 
1 For purposes of this discussion, it is assumed that the work in question is validly 
copyrighted. A discussion of the question of copyrightability and originality is beyond 
the scope of this Article. For a discussion of those issues, see generally 1 M. NIMMER, 
NIMMER ON CoPYRIGHT§§ 2.01, 2.03 (1985). 
2 See Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 501(b) (1982) [hereafter 1976 Act]. The 
1976 Act provides the owner of any of the exclusive rights with a right to sue for 
infringement of the particular right or rights belonging to that party. Thus, exclusive 
licensees as well as those who own the entire copyright have a right to sue under 
§ 501(b). See, e.g., Eden Toys, Inc. v. Florelee Undergarment Co., 697 F.2d 27 (2d 
Cir. 1982). See generally 3 M. NIMMt:R, supra note 1, § 12.02. 
3 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502 (injunctions), 503 (impounding infringing articles), 504 
(statutory or actual damages and profits of infringer), 505 (costs and attorney's fees) 
(1982). 
4 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1982). Section 106 of the 1976 Act enumerates five exclusive 
rights provided to the copyright owner. Specifically, they are the right 
( 1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; 
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the 
public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or 
lending; 
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual work, to perform 
the copyrighted work publicly; and 
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, 
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the actual work itself is reproduced, distributed, publicly performed or 
publicly displayed by the alleged infringer, this definition of infringe­
ment is sufficiently clear. Interpretation difficulties arise when the 
copyright owner complains that the alleged infringer has used a work 
not identical to the protected work, but, as in our toy cat hypothetical, 
has used portions or variations of the protected work. 
The legislative history of section 106 of the 1976 Act reveals Con­
gress' intent that a work need not be reproduced in its entirety to con­
stitute copyright infringement: 
[AI copyrighted work would be infringed by reproducing it in whole or in 
any substantial part, and by duplicating it exactly or by imitation or sim­
ulation. Wide departures or variations from the copyrighted works would 
still be an infringement as long as the author's 'expression' rather than 
merely the author's 'ideas' are taken. 5 
This language does not indicate just how wide those departures and 
variations can be and still infringe the copyright. For example, are the 
differences in head and eye size and the absence of the Cheshire grin 
too wide for the second cat to infringe the copyright on the first? 
The ambiguity surrounding the right to prepare a derivative work 
exacerbates the confusion generated by this loose definition of "repro­
ducing." The Copyright Act of 1976 defines a derivative work in part 
as a "work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a trans­
lation, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion 
picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, conden­
sation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, 
or adapted."6 Because section 106(2) of the statute provides the copy­
right owner with the exclusive right to prepare derivative works, any­
one who prepares a derivative work without permission is liable for 
copyright infringement. Again, what is left unclear is how much of the 
protected work the second work must use for it to be an infringing 
derivative work. The legislative history indicates only that "the infring­
ing work must incorporate a portion of the copyrighted work in some 
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the in­
dividual images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display 
the copyrighted work publicly. 
/d. § I 06. Sections I 07 through 118 then impose certain statutory limitations on those 
exclusive rights, including the limitations created for fair use ( § 107), library reproduc­
tion (§ 108), certain nonprofit performances (§ I 10), and others. 
5 H.R. Rt:P. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1976); S. Rt:P. No. 94-473, 
94th Cong., 1st Sess. 58 (1975) (emphasis added). 
6 17 u.s.c. § 101 (1982). 
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form."7 
The failure of Congress to address completely the issue of what con­
stitutes infringement would be less troubling if the case law enunciated 
an adequate standard. However, as we will see, no such enunciation 
exists. The courts have used a "substantial similarity" test to determine 
infringement.8 This test judges whether, in the eyes of the ordinary ob­
server, there is a substantial similarity between the protected work and 
the allegedly infringing work. In other words, the second toy cat cannot 
infringe the copyright in the first cat unless a lay observer would con­
sider the two cats to be "substantially similar." Understanding how to 
define copyright infringement requires knowing how courts determine 
substantial similarity. 
Many commentators have observed, however, that there is no general 
agreement as to the exact meaning of "substantial similarity."9 It is a 
7 H.R. Rt:l'. No. 94-1476, supra note 5, at 62; S. Rt:l'. No. 94-473, supra note 5, 
at 58 (emphasis added). The 1976 /\ct also created an issue as to whether an alleged 
infringer violates an exclusive right by performing or displaying publicly not the actual 
work, but a work that is either a "reproduction," as defined in the legislative history, or 
a "derivative work." Although the language of§§ 106(4) and 106(5) refers to perform­
ances or displays of the "copyrighted work," those rights are presumably also violated 
when the work that is performed or displayed is an infringing reproduction or an in­
fringing derivative work. The statute defines "display" as "to show a copy," 17 U.S.C. 
§ 101 (1982), so presumably as long as that copy is an infringing reproduction, the 
display right is violated, even though the actual copyrighted work has not been dis­
played. See Burwood Prods. Co. v. Marse! Mirror & Glass Prods., Inc., 468 F. Supp. 
1215, 1218 n.S (N.D. Ill. 1979); see also H. Rt:l'. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1976) 
("the right of public display applies to original works of art as well as to reproductions 
of them") (emphasis added). /\s noted, supra text accompanying note 5, a reproduction 
need not be of the entire work to infringe the copyright. Furthermore, if the defendant 
performs a work, the performance will violate the § 1 06( 4) exclusive right of perform­
ance even if the defendant has not produced a physical copy of the work. See Leo Feist, 
Inc. v. Demarie, 16 F. Supp. 827 (W.D. La. 1935) (playing copyrighted music by ear 
as opposed to from sheet music constitutes infringement). It would thus seem that if 
enough of the work has been reproduced in the performance to be considered a substan­
tial part, that performance would also infringe the copyright. 
8 See infra text accompanying notes 53-56. 
9 See, e.g., 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 1 3.03[/\[; Fleming, Substantial Similar­
ity: Where Plots Really Thicken, 19 CoPYRIGHT L. SvMI'. (/\SC/\P) 252, 262 (197 1) 
("This nebulous area of similarity is the heart of copyright law, and no doubt it is the 
most evasive part."); Knowles & Palmieri, Dissecting Krofft: An Expression of New 
Ideas in Copyright?, 8 SAN Ft:RN. V.L. Rt:v. 109, 117 (1980) ("elusive element for 
establishing copyright infringement"); Comment, Copyright Fair Use - Case Law 
and Legislation, 1969 DuKt: L.J. 73, 81-86 [hereafter Comment, Fair Use] (existence 
of various approaches to defining substantial similarity noted); Note, Copyright: 
Hollywood v. Substantial Similarity, 32 OKLA. L. Rt:v. 177, 178 (1979) [hereafter 
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phrase that, instead of becoming more understood with each judicial 
interpretation, has become more ambiguous. Although some have writ­
ten off this problem as inherent in copyright matters, 10 it is a problem 
with obvious causes and possible solutions. More importantly, it is a 
problem that has resulted in jurisprudential confusion. 
The purpose of this Article is to reduce the confusion surrounding 
determinations of infringement by proposing a new approach for decid­
ing copyright infringement. However, it is first necessary to understand 
how the current tests evolved and how they are Hawed. Part I of this 
Article traces the historical development of the tests for infringement 
from the nineteenth century through the early twentieth century to the 
pivotal opinions in Arnstein v. Porter 11 and Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu 
Ltd. 12 In these cases, the Second Circuit defined what will be referred 
to as the "traditional" approach to determining copyright infringement. 
Part II discusses how courts currently apply the traditional approach, 
and particularly focuses on substantial similarity as the keystone of that 
approach. The part also discusses how some courts have attempted to 
improve the tests while still relying on the principle of substantial simi­
larity. Finally, part III proposes a new approach that narrows the con­
cept of substantial similarity to a more objective, predictable principle. 
This approach would force courts to articulate their reasons for decid­
ing whether a particular defendant is liable for copyright infringement, 
thus making more predictable how much borrowing will constitute 
infringement. 
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 
One of the most persistent problems in defining copyright infringe­
ment has been determining the proper context for evaluating the simi­
larities between works. In one context, courts use similarities as evi­
dence tending to support an inference that the defendant saw and 
copied from the copyrighted works. In that context, courts look for the 
Note, Hollywood] (legal phrase "substantial similarity" has "spawned numerous 
tests"); Note, Copyright Infringement Actions: The Proper Role for Audience Reac­
tions in Determining Substantial Similarity, 54 S. CAt.. L. Rt:v. 385 (1981) [hereafter 
Note, Infringement] ("no complete definition has emanated from the courts"); Note, 
Substantial Similarity Between Video Games: An Old Copyright Problem in a New 
Medium, 36 VAN!>. L. Rt:v. 1277, 1290 (1983) [hereafter Note, Video Games] (courts 
disagree about "the proper method of analyzing this issue"). 
10 See, e.g., Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274 F.2d 487, 489 (2d 
Cir. 1960) ("[t]he test for infringement of a copyright is of necessity vague"). 
11 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). 
12 360 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1966). 
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type and extent of similarities that are relevant to the likelihood of in­
dependent creation by the defendant. In the other context, courts evalu­
ate the type and extent of similarities more on the basis of economic or 
aesthetic value to determine if the defendant has appropriated too much 
of the protected work in creating its work. In that context, courts are 
determining misappropriation, not simply copying. In other words, two 
ways exist to evaluate the similarities between two works: one as an 
evidentiary tool used to infer copying, the other as a substantive test of 
liability. Unfortunately, courts have often confused these two contexts 
in using the label "substantial similarity." Tracing the historical roots 
of the copyright infringement standards reveals the evolution of this 
confusing duality. 
A. Nineteenth Century Infringement Standards 
In the nineteenth century, courts deciding copyright infringement 
claims focused on three separate issues. First, the issue of copying: Did 
the defendant use the plaintiffs work, or did she create the second work 
independently? Second, the issue of misappropriation: If the defendant 
did use the plaintiffs work, did that use appropriate enough of the 
plaintiffs work to justify liability? Finally, the issue of fair use: Did 
the defendant in good faith use plaintiffs work to create a new, inde­
pendent, creative work entitled to protection as a fair use? 
1. Proof of Copying 
The first issue, copying, was the primary concern of many courts. In 
Emerson v. Davies, 13 the author of an arithmetic textbook claimed that 
the defendant had copied tables from the plaintiffs textbook and had 
arranged them in a way that made defendant's arithmetic textbook ap­
pear similar to the plaintiffs book. The court held that for plaintiff to 
succeed, he had to show not only that the defendant had seen the plain­
tiffs book, but that "the resemblances in those parts and pages are so 
close, so full, so uniform, so striking, as fairly to lead to the conclusion 
that the one is a substantial copy of the other, or mainly borrowed 
from it. In short, that there is a substantial identity between them." 14 
Taken alone, this passage might seem to indicate that the court re­
quired the plaintiff to show that defendant had copied a substantial 
portion of the protected work in a quantitative, economic, or aesthetic 
sense. However, a further reading of the case indicates that the court 
13 8 F. Cas. 615 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436). 
14 /d. at 622 (emphasis added). 
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required "substantial identity" only to determine whether the defend­
ant had used the plaintifPs work in creating his own. As the court ob­
served: "[T]he real question on this point is, not whether such resem­
blances exist, but whether these resemblances are purely accidental and 
undesigned, and unborrowed, because arising from common sources ac­
cessible to both the authors." 15 If the defendant, using public domain 
common sources, produced a book that coincidentally was similar to the 
plaintifPs book, he did not infringe the copyright. If, however, the simi­
larities were "too exact, and various, to have been wholly accidental," 
then a jury could conclude that the defendant had produced his book 
not by independent research, but by copying from the plaintifPs book. 16 
Thus, the "substantial" in "substantial copy" and "substantial iden­
tity" referred to a degree of similarity that was probative of copying, 
not a determination that what defendant had copied was substantial in 
a quantitative, economic, or aesthetic sense. 
Similarly, in Greene v. Bishop, 17 the court again compared two text­
books, this time English grammar studies, and found infringement de­
spite the defendant's argument that its book did not use the language of 
the plaintiff, but only "expresses and condenses [his] views .... " 18 The 
court reasoned: 
Copying is not confined to literal repetition, but includes, also, the various 
modes in which the matter of any publication may be adopted, imitated, or 
transferred, with more or less colorable alterations to disguise the piracy. 
In all such cases ... the main question is, whether the author of the work 
alleged to be a piracy has resorted to the original sources alike open to him 
and to all writers, or whether he has adopted and used the plan of the 
work which it is alleged he has infringed, without resorting to the other 
sources from which he had a right to borrow. 19 
A person thus infringed a copyright by using the protected work in­
stead of doing independent work. The focus was not principally on how 
much or what aspects of the plaintifPs work defendant had borrowed, 
but on whether defendant had copied the plaintifPs work rather than 
doing his own work. The concern was with whether "the labors of the 
11 /d. at 625. 
16 /d.; see also Drury v. Ewing, 7 F. Cas. 1113, 1116 (C.C.S.D. Ohio 1862) (No. 
4095) ("the true inquiry undoubtedly is, not whether the one is a facsimile of the other, 
but whether there is such a substantial identity as fairly to justify the inference that in 
getting up the guide, Mrs. Ewing has availed herself of Mrs. Drury's chart and has 
borrowed from it its essential characteristics"); 
17 10 F. Cas. 1128 (C.C.D. Mass. 1858) (No. 5763). 
18 /d. at 1130. 
19 /d. at 1134 (emphasis added). 
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original author are substantially to an injurious extent appropriated by 
another."20 The similarities between the works were thus relevant to 
determine if the defendant had in fact used the plaintiffs work. 
The emphasis placed on the question of independent creation by the 
defendant was most obvious in nonfiction works such as those at issue 
in Emerson and Greene. Even in fictional works, however, courts fo­
cused on whether the defendant had copied from the plaintiff or inde­
pendently created an original composition. For example, in Daly v. 
Palmer, 21 the plaintiff and the defendant each used what today would 
be considered a rather cliched railroad rescue scene in their otherwise 
different plays.22 The court held the defendant liable because the "sub­
stantial identity between the two scenes would naturally lead to the 
conclusion, that the later one had been adapted from the earlier one."23 
The court concluded: 
The true test of whether there is a piracy or not, is to ascertain whether 
there is a servile or evasive imitation of the plaintifrs work, or whether 
there is a bona fide original compilation, made up from common materi­
als, and common sources, with resemblances which are merely accidental, 
or result from the nature of the subject.Z4 
This court was thus also using the term "substantial identity" to re­
fer to a type of similarity that would be relevant in determining the 
likelihood of independent work by the defendant. Because the court 
concluded that the defendant did not independently create that scene in 
the play but copied from the plaintiffs play, it held the defendant lia­
ble. Thus, the initial issue in determining infringement was whether 
the similarities between the works resulted from copying by the defend­
ant. The court used the adjective "substantial" to signify a degree or 
type of similarity that would be relevant in proving that issue. 
2. Misappropriation 
Already confused in determinations of infringement, however, was 
the quite different question of whether the defendant had copied 
enough of the plaintiffs work to be held liable. As Judge Story ob­
served, the distinctions in copyright law even then were "subtile and 
20 /d. 
2• 6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3552). 
22 The scene depicted the intended victim tied to railroad tracks and then having the 
victim pulled from the tracks just before the train's arrival. /d. at 1133. 
23 /d. at 1138 (emphasis added). 
24 /d. 
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refined, and, sometimes, almost evanescent."25 However, courts recog­
nized that it was "certainly not necessary, to constitute an invasion of 
copyright, that the whole of a work should be copied, or even a large 
portion of it, in form or in substance."26 
If what was copied was small in amount but of substantial value to 
the copyright owner's work, then the defendant could be liable for 
copyright infringement. 27 For example, in Daly28 the plaintiff alleged 
that the copied railroad scene was very important to the attraction and 
success of the plaintifrs play, even though it was only one scene. The 
court concluded that copying of even just a part of the copyrighted 
work was actionable. 29 The adjective "substantial" in this context re-: 
ferred to the economic or aesthetic significance of what the defendant 
had copied. 30 
25 Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901). 
26 Id. at 348. 
27 See Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171, 173 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497) 
(infringement "does not depend so much upon the length of the extracts as upon their 
value"); Gray v. Russell, 10 F. Cas. 1035, 1038 (C.C.D. Mass. 1839) (No. 5728) (in 
finding defendant liable for infringing plaintifrs copyright in his Latin grammar text, 
court observed that focus "is not so much on the quantity as of the value of the selected 
materials"); Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348 (infringement does not "necessarily depend on 
the quantity taken," but also on "the value of the materials taken"). 
28 6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3552). 
29 See id. at 1133, 1138. In discussing the allegedly similar scene in the two different 
plays, the court observed that the defendant's use of the scene would be a piracy if that 
scene, "although performed by new and different characters, using different language, 
is recognized by the spectator ... as conveying substantially the same impressions to, 
and exciting the same emotions in, the mind, in the same sequence or order." /d. at 
1138. This passage has often been cited in support of the spectator test for copyright 
infringement, i.e., that a work is not an infringement of a protected work unless the 
ordinary observer would see them as substantially the same. In fact, however, this pas­
sage is only dicta relating to the separate issue of whether copyright extended to protect 
the idea of this scene when the dialogue, the setting, and the rest of the story differed. 
The Daly court concluded that it did if the scene itself conveyed the same impressions 
and emotions to the audience. The court's principal focus on similarities, however, re­
lated to the question of independent creation, discussed supra in text accompanying 
notes 21-24. Daly thus is weak support for the notion that there is no infringement 
unless the entire works are seen as substantially similar by the ordinary observer. The 
case is better read as looking for sufficient similarities to infer copying. See also Note, 
Hollywood, supra note 9, at 180 ("spectator test" is merely dicta in Daly opinion). 
30 See Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.D.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (in­
fringement may exist "if so much is taken, that ... the labors of the original author 
are substantially to an injurious extent appropriated by another") (emphasis added); 
Daly, 6 F. Cas. at 1138 (a work "conveying substantially the same impressions" 1s 
piracy of another) (emphasis added). 
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3. Fair Use 
Even if a plaintiff established enough copying to state a claim against 
the defendant, the courts permitted the defendant to assert the defense 
of fair use or fair "abridgement." To be a permitted abridgement, the 
second work had to condense substantially the content of the protected 
work, had to have been done in good faith, and had to be itself a new 
work that was the product of the defendant's own intellectual labor and 
judgment. 31 The degree of similarity between the two works was also 
one of several factors considered in determining the broader equitable 
defense of fair use. The fair use doctrine also considered the type of 
work involved and the way that the defendant had used that work. 32 
Thus, each of the three general issues considered in the nineteenth 
century - independent creation, misappropriation, and fair use - re­
quired considering the extent of similarity between the two works. 
Moreover, the adjective "substantial" was often used in evaluating the 
extent of similarity in each of these contexts. 
B. Changes in the Early Twentieth Century 
In the early twentieth century, the tests for infringement began to 
change. Courts began to place several more specific burdens on copy­
right plaintiffs. First, the plaintiff had to prove that the defendant had 
access to the protected work. Courts also began regularly to force plain­
tiffs to confront the issue of whether what the defendant had copied 
was copyrightable subject matter. Finally, the plaintiff specifically had 
to prove substantial similarity as a determinant of substantive liability. 
1. Access 
Although some courts had, in earlier cases, mentioned circumstances 
indicating that the defendant had been exposed to the plaintiffs work,33 
31 Story v. Holcombe, 23 F. Cas. 171, 173-75 (C.C.D. Ohio 1847) (No. 13,497) 
(fair abridgment must involve "real substantial condensation of the materials and intel­
lectual labor and judgment bestowed thereon"); Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 347-49 (copying 
entire letters of George Washington, not just "abbreviated or select passages," is not 
fair abridgment). 
32 See, e.g., Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 58-62 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 
8136) (privilege of fair use extends only to uses that "will not cause substantial injury 
... where the amount copied is small and of little value, if there is no proof of bad 
motive"). See generally W. PATRY, THF. FAIR Ust: PRIVII.F.GF. IN CoPYRIGHT LAw 
18-64 (1985 ). 
33 For example, in Daly, 6 F. Cas. at 1133-34, the plaintiff alleged that his play was 
well known and that the defendant had procured a copy of the play. The court did not, 
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in the 1920's and 1930's courts began to require that the plaintiff show 
more than similarities between the two works to prove copying: the 
plaintiff also had to show that the defendant had seen, or at least had 
had an opportunity to see, the plaintifrs workY By 1940, this require­
ment had evolved into the principle that is now a key part of the tradi­
tional approach to determining copyright infringement: the plaintiff 
must prove that the defendant had access to the protected work. Al­
though some dispute still exists as to whether the plaintiff must prove 
actual access or only opportunity for access, courts generally agree that 
showing some possibility of access is very much a part of the plaintifrs 
case. 35 
however, discuss these allegations' relevance. Similarly, in Emerson, 8 F. Cas. at 621, 
the court reasoned: 
[A]s the book of Emerson was published in 1829, and had a wide circula­
tion, and that of Davies was not published until 1840, the natural infer­
ence certainly is, that, composing a book on the same subject, for the same 
professed object ... he should ... have examined all the existing works 
published and on sale in the neighboring states upon the same subject. 
However, access was not critical according to the court, since the defendant could have 
seen the plaintiffs work but still compiled his own from other sources. This further 
demonstrates the nineteenth century's overriding concern with independent creation. 
See supra text accompanying notes 13-24. 
34 The earliest case found that explicitly required a showing of access was Simonton 
v. Gordon, 12 F.2d 116 (S.D.N.Y. 1925), involving a claim that the defendant's play 
had infringed plaintiffs novel. The court held: 
[A) play may· fairly be subjected to a charge of piracy, if a substantial 
number of its incidents, scenes and episodes are, in detail, arrangement, 
and combination, so nearly identical with those to be found in a book, to 
which the author has access, as to exclude all reasonable possibility of 
chance coincidence, and lead inevitably to the conclusion that they were 
taken from the book. 
/d. at 120 (emphasis added). By the mid-1930's, courts were regularly referring to the 
element of access as a part of the plaintiffs case distinct from the element of substantial 
similarity. See, e.g., Deutsch v. Arnold, 98 F.2d 686, 688 (2d Cir. 1938); Wilkie v. 
Santly Bros., 91 F.2d 978, 979 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 302 U.S. 735 (1937); Arnstein v. 
Edward B. Marks Music Corp., 82 F.2d 275, 276 (2d Cir. 1936); Caruthers v. R.K.O. 
Radio Pictures, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 906, 907 (S.D.N.Y. 1937); Hirsch v. Paramount 
Pictures, Inc., 17 F. Supp. 816, 817 (S.D. Cal. 1937); Echevarria v. Warner Bros. 
Pictures, 12 F. Supp. 632, 638, 639 (S.D. Cal. 1935). 
35 Compare, e.g., Schwarz v. Universal Pictures Co., 85 F. Supp. 270 (S.D. Cal. 
1945) (access not established if no proof that protected work was actually seen by party 
creating allegedly infringing work) with Smith v. Little, Brown & Co., 245 F. Supp. 
451 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), affd, 360 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1966) (evidence of opportunity to 
see protected work is sufficient to establish access); see also Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 
901 (7th Cir. 1984) (must be evidence sufficient to infer reasonable possibility of ac­
cess); 3 M. NIMM•:R, supra note 1, § 13.02[A). 
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2. The Idea/Expression Dichotomy 
More significantly, at about the same time courts began consistently 
to address whether the defendant had copied protected material and not 
simply uncopyrightable materials. This required the courts to consider 
whether a defendant had copied simply uncopyrightable ideas or the 
plaintifrs protected expression. In Dymow v. Bolton,36 the defendant 
used a love plot similar to that used by the plaintiff in his play, but the 
defendant set his play in the theatre industry instead of the garment 
industry, which the plaintiff had used. The court concluded that even if 
the defendant had copied the plot from the plaintifrs play, he took 
nothing copyrightable since copyright does not protect ideas and funda­
mental plots. 
With Judge Learned Hand's famous pronouncement in 1930 in 
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. regarding the vague line between 
protectable expression and unprotectable idea,37 the dichotomy between 
expression and idea became an increasingly important issue in copy-
An exception to this requirement does exist, however, if the similarities between the 
two works are so striking that there could be no other possible explanation for those 
similarities but that the defendant had access to and copied the plaintifrs work. See, 
e.g., Association of Am. Medical Colleges v. Mikaelian, 571 F. Supp. 144, 150-51 
(E.D. Pa. 1983), affd mem., 734 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1984) (similarities in test questions 
"preclude the possibility of independent creation"); see also Ferguson v. National 
Broadcasting Co., 584 F.2d ttl, 113 (5th Cir. 1978) (insufficient evidence of striking 
similarity to support summary judgment for plaintiff); Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 
154 F.2d 480, 488 (2d Cir. 1946) (although not found in case at bar, "copying might 
be demonstrated, with no proof or weak proof of access, by showing that a single brief 
phrase, contained in both pieces (of music], was so idiosyncratic in its treatment as to 
preclude coincidence"); Stratchborneo v. Arc Music Corp., 357 F. Supp. 1393, 1403 
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (striking similarity, which requires demonstration "that such similari­
ties are of a kind that can only be explained by copying, rather than by coincidence, 
independent creation, or prior common source," not proven in case at bar). But see 
Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 901 (7th Cir. 1984) (must be at least minimal evidence 
supporting reasonable possibility of access); see also 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 
13.02(8). 
36 It F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1926). 
37 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930): 
Upon any work, and especially upon a play, a great number of pat­
terns, of increasing generality will fit equally well, as more and more of 
the incident is left out. The last may perhaps be no more than the most 
general statement of what the play is about, and at times might consist 
only of its title; but there is a point in this series of abstractions where 
they are no longer protected, since otherwise the playwright could prevent 
the use of his 'ideas,' to which, apart from their expression, his property is 
never extended. 
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right cases.38 The expanded importance of that principle reduced the 
significance of the independent creation issue because it recognized that 
defendants were allowed to copy some aspects of a copyright owner's 
work. If the defendant copied ideas rather than expression, the defend­
ant was not liable. 39 
3. Misappropriation 
Courts also altered the focus in infringement litigation by requiring 
the plaintiff to show that the defendant had created a work that the 
ordinary observer would consider a misappropriation of the copyrighted 
work. Although case authority for this notion dates back at least to 
Daly,40 the Second Circuit explicitly made this requirement a regular 
part of proving copyright infringement in Arnstein v. Porter. 41 In that 
case the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, Cole Porter, had infringed 
the copyright in several musical compositions created and copyrighted 
by the plaintiff. The court outlined a two-part test for copyright in­
fringement: whether there was copying, and if so, whether "the copying 
... went so far as to constitute improper appropriation."42 In making 
the first determination, the trier of fact would examine evidence of ac­
cess and similarity: "Of course, if there are no similarities, no amount 
of evidence of access will suffice to prove copying. If there is evidence of 
access and similarities exist, then the trier of fact must determine 
whether the similarities are sufficient to prove copying."43 To evaluate 
competently the likelihood of copying, expert testimony and analysis 
would be admissible. 44 Thus, the first part of the Arnstein test focused 
38 In the Copyright Act of 1976, Congress made this principle part of the statutory 
law by excluding from the subject matter of copyright "any idea, procedure, process, 
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery." 17 U .S.C. § 1 02(b) 
( 1982). 
39 See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 217 (1954) (copyright extends to particu­
lar form of plaintiffs statuettes, but not to idea of using statuette of human figures as 
lamp base); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 109 (1879) (copyright protects author's ex­
planation of bookkeeping method, but not method itself); Nichols v. Universal Pictures 
Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930) (copyright on play does not extend to basic idea of 
lovers of different backgrounds and parental disapproval of their relationship). 
40 6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1868) (No. 3552); see supra note 29. 
41 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). 
42 /d. at 468. 
43 /d. 
44 /d. Such analysis was particularly important for musical works. As the Second 
Circuit observed in Darrell v. Joe Morris Music Co., 113 F.2d 80, 80 (2d Cir. 1940): 
"[W]hile there are an enormous number of possible permutations of the musical notes 
of the scale, only a few are pleasing; and much fewer still suit the infantile demands of 
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simply on the issue of independent creation. 
The second part of the Arnstein test was in some ways a departure 
from earlier definitions of infringement. The court said that even if the 
plaintiff established copying by evidence of access and similarities prop­
erly dissected and analyzed, it is still necessary to determine whether 
that copying went so far as to constitute improper appropriation. This 
second test was related to the nineteenth century concern with the value 
of what the defendant had copied.45 The court, however, now applied a 
test based on the subjective reactions of lay observers: "On that issue 
. . . the test is the response of the ordinary lay hearer"46 as to 
"whether defendant took from plaintifrs works so much of what is 
pleasing to the ears of lay listeners, who comprise the audience for 
whom such popular music is composed, that defendant wrongfully ap­
propriated something which belongs to the plaintiff."47 The court fur­
ther held that expert testimony, detailed analysis, and careful dissection 
were not a proper basis for determining misappropriation: 
The proper criterion on [the misappropriation] issue is not an analytic or 
other comparison of the respective musical compositions as they appear on 
paper or in the judgment of trained musicians .... The impression 
made on the refined ears of musical experts or their views as to the musi­
cal excellence of plaintifrs or defendant's works are utterly immaterial on 
the issue of misappropriation; for views of such persons are caviar to the 
general-and the plaintifrs and defendant's compositions are not caviar.48 
The trier of fact was thus left to depend upon some visceral reaction 
as the basis for determining misappropriation. Copyright infringement 
hinged on whether an ordinary observer would conclude that the de­
fendant had copied too much of the plaintifrs material. Instead of using 
some objective standards or criteria based on economic impact or quan­
tity, courts were to determine infringement on an unpredictable, im­
pressionistic basis. 
The Second Circuit exacerbated this test's ambiguity in 1966 when it 
the popular ear. Recurrence is not therefore an inevitable badge of plagiarism." There­
fore, even though the two songs at issue in Darrell both included the same eight-note 
sequence several times such that it constituted a significant part of each song, the court 
concluded that this was not enough evidence to infer copying, given the commonness of 
that eight-note sequence. In other words, the similarity was not substantial enough to 
infer copying, given what experts could state about the possible universe of pleasing 
melodies and the likelihood in that context that any two composers might independently 
invent the same musical sequence. 
45 See supra text accompanying notes 27-30. 
46 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468. 
47 /d. at 473. 
48 /d. 
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decided Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd.49 Although the Second Circuit 
in Arnstein50 had separated the issue of copying from the issue of mis­
appropriation, in Ideal Toy Corp. the court effectively abandoned that 
separation. In that case the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had 
infringed the copyrights in two of plaintiffs dolls. The plaintiff re­
quested a preliminary injunction against the defendant's manufacture 
and sale of the accused dolls. The district court denied the plaintiffs 
request, finding that the defendant's dolls did not misappropriate the 
expression in the plaintiffs dolls. According to the district court, "the 
total effect of the image conveyed to an ordinary observer by the ac­
cused dolls is quite distinct from that of plaintiffs dolls."51 On appeal, 
the plaintiff argued that the district court had erred by relying on the 
misappropriation requirement incorrectly imposed on plaintiffs in Arn­
stein.52 That is, the plaintiff seemingly argued that the court should 
abandon the second element of the Arnstein test, which required a 
showing of misappropriation in addition to a showing of copying. 
In response to this argument, the Second Circuit stated first that 
proof of copyright infringement required a showing of "substantial sim­
ilarity" between the two works, and that "substantial similarity" was 
present when "an average lay observer would recognize the alleged 
copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work."53 In 
other words, the ordinary observer's determination that the two works 
were substantially similar was to be based on that observer's determi­
nation that the defendant had copied from the plaintiff. The court then 
said that the element of misappropriation identified in Arnstein "was 
merely an alternative way of formulating the issue of substantial simi­
larity . . . although the use of the term 'improper appropriation' some­
what obscures the issue. " 54 Thus, instead of conducting two separate 
inquiries into the works' similarities, first to establish copying and then 
to determine misappropriation, the court indicated that there need be 
just one determination of "substantial similarity" based on whether an 
ordinary observer could detect copying. If copying was so detectable, 
49 360 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1966}. 
50 154 F.2d 464. 
51 Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 266 F. Supp. 755, 756 (S.D.N.Y. 1965}, affd, 
360 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1966). 
52 See Ideal Toy Corp., 360 F.2d at 1023 n.2. 
53 /d. at 1022. Although the phrase "substantial similarity" had been used earlier, 
see, e.g., Comptone Co. v. Rayex Corp., 251 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1958), it was in Ideal 
Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd. that the court first defined that phrase in connection with 
the ordinary observer test. 
54 Ideal Toy Corp., 360 F.2d at 1023 n.2. 
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then the defendant had misappropriated as well. 
By combining the issues of copying and misappropriation,55 the Sec­
ond Circuit reduced the infringement test to, first, proof of access and, 
second, substantial similarity to the ordinary observer. This test is re­
ferred to hereafter as the "traditional approach" to copyright 
infringement. 56 
55 See Ideal Toy Corp. v. Kenner Prods. Div. of General Mills Fun Group, Inc., 
443 F. Supp. 291, 303 n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (the two steps of the Arnstein process 
"seem to have merged into the single lay-observer test for substantial similarity an­
nounced in Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd. (Inc.)" (citation omitted)). 
56 In Walker v. Time Life Films, Inc., 784 F.2d 44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 106 
S. Ct. Rptr. 2278 (1986), the Second Circuit seemed to recognize the need to restore a 
bifurcated analysis of copying and misappropriation. In describing the plaintiffs bur­
den of proof, the court, citing Arnstein and other decisions, held that the plaintiff 
"must show that his book was 'copied,' by proving access and substantial similarity 
between the works, and also show that his expression was 'improperly appropriated,' 
by proving that the similarities relate to copyrightable material." Walker, 784 F.2d at 
48. This bifurcation is in fact quite different from and, at first glance, an improvement 
over the Arnstein approach. The court seemed to be saying that evidence of access and 
substantial similarity would be used to determine the issue of copying, not misappropri­
ation. The second element of the plaintiffs claim would not be misappropriation in the 
traditional sense, i.e., copying of too much of what was valuable in the plaintiffs work, 
but rather would require only a showing that what the defendant had copied was pro­
tectable expression. Such an approach is similar to that proposed in this Article, and 
would greatly improve the copyright decisionmaking process for the reasons described 
herein. See infra text accompanying notes 135-56. 
In fact, however, the Second Circuit did not go quite so far and the copyright deci­
sionmaking process remains quite muddy. Later in its opinion, in discussing the ques­
tion of whether expert analysis is admissible to prove substantial similarity, the court 
restates its earlier bifurcated test. First, the plaintiff must show copying and then "'il­
licit copying' ... which demands that such similarities relate to protectible [sic] mate­
rial." Walker, 784 F.2d at 51. The court then quotes the language from Arnstein pro­
viding that on the first issue expert analysis and dissection are admissible, but that on 
the second issue, the test is the response of the lay observer, and dissection is irrelevant. 
/d. This seems inconsistent. If the second test is a determination of whether what was 
copied was protectable expression, then dissection seems critical; the response of the lay 
observer would be irrelevant. The court nowhere explains this inconsistency. 
Moreover, its application of this bifurcated test in the case before it is not instructive. 
The defendant's evidence of expert analysis consisted of an affidavit from a literary 
expert demonstrating how the plot, themes, structure, pace, and character of the de­
fendant's film differed from the plaintiffs book. The court used this evidence in con­
cluding that all that the defendant had copied from the plaintiffs book was un­
copyrightable facts and ideas. Thus, it was used to determine if "illicit copying" had 
occurred. This is the second prong of Arnstein, which considers such dissection inap­
propriate. /d. at 52. The court thus seems to be clinging to Arnstein in words only, not 
in application. 
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II. THE ROLE OF SUBSTANTIAL SIMILARITY IN CURRENT TESTS 
FOR INFRINGEMENT 
As discussed above, in the first half of the twentieth century, courts 
combined two of the three copyright infringement issues addressed sep­
arately in nineteenth century cases. In the nineteenth century, courts 
separately considered the issues of copying, misappropriation, and fair 
useY By relying on the concept of "substantial similarity" as deter­
mined by an ordinary observer, the Second Circuit in Ideal Toy v. Fab­
Lu Ltd. 58 confused the issue of copying with that of misappropriation. 
The confusion of these two issues had many undesirable consequences, 
as is shown by examining the way more recent courts have used "sub­
stantial similarity" in determining infringement. 
A. The Traditional Approach 
The principal difficulty with the traditional approach59 is not the is­
sue of access, but rather the way courts use the concept of substantial 
similarity. At least four problems plague the concept of substantial sim­
ilarity as used in the traditional test for copyright infringement. First, it 
fails to separate the issue of copying from the issue of misappropriation. 
Second, it ineptly deals with the dichotomy between idea and expres­
sion by obscuring that legal principle in determinations that eschew 
dissection and analysis. Third, it nowhere indicates how to determine 
how much similarity is too much. Thus, it leaves the courts with an ad 
hoc, subjective approach that is not workable or fair. Finally, combin­
ing the test with the fair use doctrine as currently defined causes courts 
to consider the degree of similarity between the works twice when the 
fair use defense is asserted, resulting in an inefficient use of the courts' 
time. 
1. The Failure to Distinguish Copying from Misappropriation 
Several cases involving alleged infringement of the copyright in fabric 
patterns illustrate the traditional approach's obscuring of the issue of 
whether the similarities between two works support an inference of 
copying. In Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp.,60 the Sec­
ond Circuit concluded, in comparing two fabric patterns and finding a 
likelihood of infringement, that the "ordinary observer, unless he set 
57 See supra text accompanying notes 13-32. 
5s 360 F.2d 1021 (2d Cir. 1966). 
59 See supra text accompanying notes SS-56. 
60 274 F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960). 
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out to detect the disparities, would be disposed to overlook them, and 
regard their aesthetic appeal as the same."61 The opinion in Peter Pan 
Fabrics, written in 1960, predated Ideal Toy Corp., in which the Sec­
ond Circuit defined "substantial similarity" as whether the ordinary 
observer would be able to detect copying. By contrast, Peter Pan 
Fabrics focused simply on the overall aesthetic appeal to the ordinary 
observer. The issue of copying was a separate concern. In three fabric 
design cases decided after I deal Toy Corp., however, the court merged 
the ordinary observer test as used to gauge overall aesthetic appeal with 
the definition of substantial similarity as detectable copying with unde­
sirable results. Now the determination of copying was based simply on 
the overall aesthetic appeal to the ordinary observer. 
For example, in Novelty Textile Mills v. Joan Fabrics Corp.,62 the 
court quoted both the Peter Pan Fabrics "aesthetic appeal" test and 
the Ideal Toy Corp. "detectable copying" test in its definition of sub­
stantial similarity, without commenting on the differences between 
them. The defendant admitted access to the copyrighted fabric pattern, 
but claimed that it did not copy the pattern in creating its own pattern. 
Without ever analyzing the similarities to determine either the likeli­
hood of such independent creation or the likelihood of copying, the 
court simply concluded that to lay eyes, the fabrics were "almost identi­
cal,"63 and that therefore the defendant had infringed the plaintiffs 
copyright. 
Similarly, in two district court decisions, the courts relied on the Pe­
ter Pan Fabrics formulation of the ordinary observer test in concluding 
that the fabrics at issue were substantially similar. That is, in the 
courts' views, the fabrics would have the same overall effect and would 
appear identical or almost identical to the ordinary observer.64 Again, 
the courts conducted no separate analysis of the similarities to support 
the inference of copying. 65 Many basic fabric patterns, including floral 
61 /d. at 489 (preliminary injunction affirmed). 
62 558 F.2d 1090, 1093 (2d Cir. 1977). 
63 /d. 
64 See Kenbrooke Fabrics, Inc. v. Holland Fabrics, Inc., 602 F. Supp. 151, 154 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Lauratex Textile Corp. v. Allton Knitting Mills, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 
900, 902-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
65 In Kenbrooke Fabrics, 602 F. Supp. at 154-55, the defendant unsuccessfully at­
tempted to prove independent creation by introducing rebuttal evidence. Copyright law 
generally provides that once the plaintiff demonstrates access and substantial similarity, 
a presumption of copying by the defendant arises. The burden then shifts to allow the 
defendant to rebut that presumption by introducing evidence that would explain how 
those similarities occurred if not by copying. Miller v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 650 
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patterns and plaids, existed for hundreds of years. Therefore, it would 
arguably have been appropriate for the courts to have considered the 
likelihood that the defendants created their designs independently or by 
using common public domain sources rather than the plaintiffs' works. 
By relying upon the ordinary observer test alone and thus rejecting 
dissection, analysis, and expert testimony, the courts were deprived of 
the evidence necessary to analyze properly the likelihood of indepen­
dent creation. Thus, when the ordinary observer test for substantial 
similarity is based on overall aesthetic appeal, as it was in these cases, 
courts may overlook the important issue of the likelihood of copying by 
the defendant, an issue for which such an ordinary observer test is not 
well-suited. 66 Simply because a party had an opportunity to see a pro-
F.2d 1365, 1375 (5th Cir. 1981); John L. Perry Studio, Inc. v. Wernick, 597 F.2d 
1308, 1310 (9th Cir. 1979); Granite Music Corp. v. United Artists Corp., 532 F.2d 
718,721-24 (9th Cir. 1976); see also Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, 
Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 829 (11th Cir. 1982); Kamar lnt'l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie & Co., 657 
F.2d 1059, 1062 (9th Cir. 1981); Novelty Textile Mills v. Joan Fabrics Corp., 558 
F.2d 1090, 1092 n.2 (2d Cir. 1977). For example, evidence of the use of preexisting 
common sources, see Granite Music Corp., 532 F.2d at 720, or of entirely independent 
creation, John L. Perry, 597 F.2d at 1309 n.2, would be probative and relevant to this 
issue. Although the court in Kenbrooke Fabrics recognized that sometimes such proof 
can overcome a finding of copying based on "substantial similarity," the court's finding 
of substantial similarity between the fabrics was based on a test that by definition pre­
cluded any analysis of the likelihood of copying by the defendant. Since a presumption 
of copying arises from a finding of substantial similarity, it would seem logical to define 
"substantial similarity" so as to consider factors relevant to the likelihood of copying, 
not simply similarity in aesthetic impact. Otherwise, the presumption has no logical 
basis and is based on pure conjecture. 
66 Furthermore, even if courts were to use the Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd. for­
mulation of the ordinary observer test, which asks if the ordinary observer would be 
able to tell that the defendant copied from the plaintiff, the test is flawed. Many com­
mentators have recognized that the ordinary observer is not really capable of determin­
ing if copying has occurred. Professor Nimmer observed that the lay observer's visceral 
reactions "may not always prove an accurate guide to ferreting out the existence of 
literary theft," 3 M. NIMMER, supra note I, § 13.03(EJ[2], because the ordinary ob­
server cannot realistically determine if the defendant's work had to be the result of 
copying from the plaintiffs work, as opposed to the result of independent creation. 
Thus, Professor Nimmer concludes that the ordinary observer test is not an effective 
method to determine copying. 
Robert Fuller Fleming also asks, "Why should the ordinary observer be expected to 
detect spontaneously and immediately the theft which probably took weeks and months 
to disguise?" Fleming, supra note 9, at 275. In discussing the confusion generated 
when the substantial similarity test is used to compare two works with similar plots, 
Fleming concludes that "[p]erhaps the greatest obstacle to copyright protection of plots 
is the wholesale and unrelenting use of the ordinary observer test as the test of similar­
ity for the factfinder, along with the use of its corollary, the limitation on expert testi-
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tected work, and produces a work that ordinary observers would see as 
mony." !d. at 279. Because infringers can disguise the copying of plots by slight varia­
tions in insignificant settings or incidents, an ordinary observer may not be able to 
detect that copying has occurred without the assistance of expert testimony. /d. at 275; 
see also Sorensen & Sorensen, Re-examining the Traditional Legal Test of Literary 
Similarity: A Proposal for Content Analysis, 37 CoRNELl. L.Q. 638, 649 (1952) (pro­
posing quantitative content analysis approach to determine "the probability that such 
similarity did not occur by chance," rejecting use of emotional reaction of ordinary 
observers as means of determining that issue). 
Others have specifically criticized the ordinary observer test as a way to detect copy­
ing when the sophisticated nature of the copyrighted materials allegedly infringed 
makes that test entirely inappropriate. For example, in Whelan Associates, Inc. v. ]as­
low Dental Laboratory, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 
877 (1987), the court concluded that the ordinary observer test "is of doubtful value in 
cases involving computer programs on account of the programs' complexity and unfa­
miliarity to most members of the public." /d. at 1232. The court therefore decided to 
"adopt a single substantial similarity inquiry according to which both lay and expert 
testimony would be admissible," id. at 1233, in cases involving exceptionally complex 
works such as computer programs. See also E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp. of Am., 
623 F. Supp. 1485, 1493 (D. Minn. 1985) ("fiction" of ordinary observer test replaced 
with an "iterative" approach relying on expert analysis in cases involving infringement 
of computer software copyrights). See generally Note, Copyright Infringement of Com­
puter Programs: A Modification of the Substantial Similarity Test, 68 MINN. L. REv. 
1264 (1984); Note, Defining the Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Software, 
38 STAN. L. REV. 497 (1986). 
In fact, those commentators who praise the ordinary observer test and consider it the 
most effective way to determine substantial similarity focus not on the use of substantial 
similarity as evidence used to establish the existence of copying, but on the use of sub­
stantial similarity to determine the substantive issue of misappropriation. For example, 
Jeffrey G. Sherman concludes that the lay audience is best suited to determine substan­
tial similarity between musical works. Sherman, Musical Copyright Infringement: The 
Requirement of Substantial Similarity, 22 CoPYRIGHT L. SYMP. (ASCAP) 81 ( 1977). 
Sherman reasons that because "a certain amount of similarity with previously written 
music is statistically impossible to avoid," id. at 124, only the lay audience will be able 
to determine if those similarities are substantial enough to justify liability: "The 
mechanics of the sequence of notes are not what an audience hears or cares about. If a 
composer takes only those aspects of a composition, he has taken nothing of value and 
should therefore not be made to pay damages," id. at 135. Thus, Sherman apparently 
believes substantial similarity should be used to determine not copying, but 
misappropriation. 
Similarly, in Note, Infringements, supra note 9, the author proposes that instead of 
the average lay observer being the appropriate one to determine substantial similarity, 
the specific audience for the particular work should be the focus because the members 
of that audience are the ones who provide the copyright owner with the economic in­
centive and rewards. The author reasons that since the plaintiff will only be injured if 
that specific audience would replace its work with the defendant's copy, it is that audi­
ence's view that should be determinative. /d. at 393-94. Again, the focus is on deter­
mining misappropriation, not proof of copying. See Knowles & Palmieri, supra note 9, 
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substantially the same, should not always raise an inference of copying. 
2. The Failure to Distinguish Ideas from Expression 
A second problem with using the standard of substantial similarity as 
determined by the ordinary observer as the keystone to copyright in­
fringement is that the test inadequately deals with the dichotomy be­
tween the uncopyrightable elements of a copyrighted work and copy­
rightable expression. This separation is particularly important with 
respect to the dichotomy between idea and expression. If the plaintiff is 
using substantial similarity as proof of copying, reliance on similarities 
in ideas as well as expression may be appropriate, as those similarities 
may be probative of the issue of independent creation by the defend­
antY However, if the court is considering similarity in ideas to deter­
mine misappropriation and thus liability, there is a problem because 
those ideas are not protected by copyright and thus cannot be "misap­
propriated." The traditional approach casually assumes that the ordi­
nary observer is able to keep this dichotomy in mind when determining 
whether the aesthetic appeal of the two works is the same. 
Consider, for example, the two series of "action figures" at issue in 
Mattei, Inc. v. Azrak-Hamway International: 
Though the dolls' bodies are very similar, nearly all of the similarity can 
be attributed to the fact that both are artist's renderings of the same un­
protectable idea - a superhuman muscleman crouching in what since Ne­
anderthal times has been a traditional fighting pose. The rendering of 
at 141-44 (ordinary observer test should not be used to determine, objectively, likeli­
hood of independent creation, but rather should be used to determine, on personalized, 
subjective basis, if infringement has occurred); Note, Video Games, supra note 9, at 
1310-1 1 (because key issue in infringement is whether public believes two works are 
substantially similar, audience test should be used to determine if two video games are 
similar with respect to the "play" of game as well as visual and literal expression). All 
these commentators see the ordinary observer test as a good method of determining 
misappropriation, that is, whether the works are similar enough to cause the plaintiff 
harm; their analysis does not relate to the separate and essential question of whether 
the defendant copied from the plaintiffs work. 
As discussed infra note 71, the ordinary observer test is also not well-suited to deter­
mine misappropriation because of the confusion that test creates with respect to the 
dichotomy between the protected expression and the unprotected elements of the copy­
righted work. Certainly when all three issues are considered at once - copying, misap­
propriation, and the scope of protected expression - the ordinary observer test is not 
an adequate basis for determining infringement. 
67 There would, of course, still need to be a separate finding that some of what was 
copied was protected expression. See supra text accompanying notes 36-39 and cases 
cited therein. 
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such an idea is not in itself protectable; only the particularized expression 
of that idea, for example, the particular form created by the decision to 
accentuate certain muscle groups relative to others, can be protected .... 
In this case a lay observer would recognize certain differences in the way 
the two sculptors have created images of strength by overemphasizing cer­
tain muscle groups.68 
This court's assumptions about the perceptiveness of the lay observer 
are probably too generous. After all, the lay observer is not supposed to 
be dissecting or analyzing the two works.69 To expect that observer to 
notice which muscle groups are emphasized, in order to see if just ideas 
or expression are similar, is obviously inconsistent with the visceral, 
generalized approach that the courts prefer. The ordinary observer is 
therefore likely to include the unprotected idea - the general notion of 
a crouching, muscular man - in determining substantial similarity. 
Misappropriation should, however, be determined by looking only at 
how that idea is expressed, e.g., which muscle groups are emphasized.70 
The ordinary observer relying upon generalized reactions is not well­
suited for that task.71 
68 724 F.2d 357, 360 (2d Cir. 1983) (emphasis added). 
69 See supra text accompanying notes 46-48. 
70 See Williams Elec., Inc. v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 568 F. Supp. 1274 (N.D. Ill. 1983) 
(only copyrightable elements of pinball games compared in finding no substantial simi­
larity); Mosley v. Follett, 1978-81 Copyright L. Rep. (CCH) 1l 25,202 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980) (only copyrightable portions of fact-based novel compared in finding no substan­
tial similarity). 
71 The difficulty of this task is also indicated by the failure of some judges to agree 
on how ordinary observers would react in a particular case. For example, in Eden 
Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1982), the judges could not 
agree as to whether the defendant's snowman doll was substantially similar only in 
ideas or also in expression to the plaintiffs copyrighted snowman doll. The defendant's 
snowman had a different shaped body (round v. square), different type of hat (large 
and shaped v. floppy), different color face (rosy v. white) and scarf (tauersall v. green) 
from the plaintiffs doll. The majority affirmed summary judgment in favor of the de­
fendant, agreeing with the district judge that the similarities were only those that 
"would appear to the ordinary observer to result from the fact that both are snowmen." 
/d. at 500. Judge Lumbard dissented because he concluded that the ordinary observer 
would overlook the differences and find the dolls similar in expression as well as ideas. 
He did not explain, however, how the ordinary observer would separate the expression 
from the ideas, nor how he himself had separated them. 
Others have recognized the inability of jurors as ordinary observers to separate ideas 
from expression. In Bevans v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 329 F. Supp. 601, 604 
n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), Judge Tyler criticized the use of the ordinary observer test except 
for "comparatively simple fields such as fabrics or clothing designs." In that case the 
court compared a play (Stalag 17) and a television program (the Hogan's Heroes pi­
lot). The court overturned the verdict in the plaintiffs favor because unprotectable 
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3. The Failure to Provide Guidelines to Determine Misap­
propriation 
A third problem with the concept of substantial similarity as used in 
the traditional approach to copyright infringement is the inconsistencies 
it has created in the determinations of how much similarity in expres­
sion is "substantial." There is no objective framework for defining how 
much copying is too much. 
Some courts emphasize the aesthetic or financial value of the portion 
that a defendant has substantially copied. This approach may be 
termed the "value" approach. For example, in WPOW, Inc. v. MRLJ 
Enterprises,72 the court compared the defendant's engineering report in 
its application to the Federal Communications Commission for con­
struction of broadcasting facilities with a report the plaintiff had in­
cluded in its application. The court found infringement, reasoning that 
ideas had been considered in finding the works substantially similar. Judge Tyler ob­
served: 
Although the jury was specifically instructed to disregard those similarities 
which were virtually necessitated by the use of the same historical setting, 
clearly in the public domain, the difficulty of sifting out fur comparison 
only the protectible [sic] material is particularly great where, as here, non­
protectible [sic] similarities are so pervasive. 
/d. at 607. 
Professor Gary L. Francione also criticized the ordinary observer test for giving 
factfinders too broad a role in determining the dichotomy between unprotected ideas 
and facts, and protected expression. He argued that the determination is subsumed in 
determinations of substantial similarity. Professor Francione pointed out that this may 
create first amendment problems if ideas are in fact given copyright protection as a 
result of the "totality approach" to determining copyright infringement. Thus, he 
would prefer an approach wherein the determination of what is protected expression 
and what is unprotectable idea or fact is determined as a matter of law, not fact. Fran­
done, Facing the Nation: The Standards for Copyright, Infringement, and Fair Use 
of Factual Works, 134 U. PA. L. R.:v. 519, 557-67 (1986). 
Professor Nimmer has also criticized the ordinary observer or audience test, for simi­
lar reasons. He recognized that by avoiding dissection and analysis the lay observer will 
be unable to distinguish the protected elements from the unprotected elements of the 
plaintifrs work. 3M. NIMM~:R, supra note 1, § 13.03[E], at 13-60. Another author has 
suggested that the ordinary observer test has led to "sloppy jurisprudence" in which the 
courts find copying without distinguishing idea from expression. The author suggests 
that this is a particular problem in determining infringement of the copyright in motion 
pictures. Because themes are frequently reused in motion pictures, the overall films 
could seem similar to a lay observer. The author argues that a test using some analysis 
of the works, as well as some recognition of the industry custom of reviving popular 
themes, should be adopted to determine substantial similarity between works involving 
the motion picture industry. Note, Hollywood, supra note 9, at 181, 187-90. 
72 584 F. Supp. 132 (D.D.C. 1984). 
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"[ w ]hatever similarities or differences there are in the reports generally, 
the critical parts of the reports - the antenna design - are identical. 
Taking what is in essence the heart of the work is considered a taking 
of a substantial nature, even if what is actually taken is less than 
extensive."73 The court did not focus on the many overall differences 
between the two reports. Rather, the court based its finding of substan­
tial similarity on· the fact that the defendant had incorporated this one 
part, the design, into the report. 
The court did not consider whether an ordinary observer would see 
the whole report as the same. It looked only at the antenna design, and 
because of the importance of that one part and the similarities with 
respect to that one part, the court found substantial similarity.74 Thus, 
sometimes the "substantial" in substantial similarity focuses on the im­
portance or value of the portion copied, and not on substantiality rela­
tive to the overall work. 
Other courts focus instead on whether observers will confuse the two 
works as a whole and will thus be likely to substitute one for the other. 
This approach to determining misappropriation may be termed the 
"audience confusion" approach. In those cases, courts consider both dif­
ferences and similarities in the works. Differences added by the defend­
ants can serve to offset the degree of similarity between the works. 
For example, in Novelty Textile Mills, Inc. v. Joan Fabrics Corp.,75 
a federal district court had denied preliminary injunctive relief to the 
plaintiff, when the plaintiff claimed that the defendant had infringed its 
copyright in a fabric design. The district court had found no substantial 
similarity because it concluded that the differences would be apparent 
to a furniture manufacturer or serious consumer.76 The Second Circuit 
reversed, finding substantial similarity to the ordinary observer,77 even 
though, as pointed out in Judge Mansfield's concurring opinion, there 
were several "marked differences" in the dimensions and composition 
of the pattern.78 The determining factor was not the amount taken in 
73 /d. at 136 (emphasis added). 
74 See also Universal City Studios v. Kamar Industries, 1982 CoPYRIGHT L. REP. 
(CCH) ~ 25,452 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (holding defendant liable for infringing copyright in 
film, E. T. -the Extra-Terrestrial, for using on mugs and pencil holders that it man­
ufactured just one actual line from that film, "E.T. Phone Home"); Henry Holt & Co. 
v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F. Supp. 302 (E.D. Pa. 1938) (copying of three 
_sentences from plaintifPs book not so insubstantial as to justify dismissing complaint). 
75 558 F.2d 1090 (2d Cir. 1977). 
76 /d. at 1093. 
77 See id. at 1094. 
78 Id. Judge Mansfield concurred with the majority because he concluded that by 
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absolute or relative terms, but only whether the ordinary observer 
would tend to see the two works as the same.79 In other words, would 
creating a fabric using the same colors as well as the same general pattern of plaid, the 
defendant had created a fabric that had the same overall effect as the plaintiffs fabric. 
See id. at 1095. He thus focused on the overall work and its effect on the consumer. He 
differed with some dicta in the majority's opinion, however, in that he concluded that if 
someone were to use that plaid with different colors, the effect would not be substan­
tially similar. See id. The majority observed that changing the colors would not protect 
a defendant from liability for infringement of the design, even though some of those 
changes would make the two patterns not appear substantially similar to the ordinary 
observer. See id. at 1094 n.6. In the majority's view, if only the pattern of the plaid was 
protected, the ordinary observer should compare only that pattern in determining sub­
stantial similarity. See id. Such fine distinctions are probably beyond the perceptive 
abilities of a lay observer viewing the works without analysis or dissection, just as the 
subtle line between idea and expression would often be missed by that ordinary ob­
server. See supra note 77. 
79 The importance of overall impressions is evident in cases that find no liability 
because the defendant, although copying some protected expression, made sufficient 
changes so that the works as a whole do not appear substantially similar. See, e.g., 
American Greetings Corp. v. Easter Unlimited, Inc., 579 F. Supp. 607 (S.D.N.Y. 
1983) ("cumulative effect" of differences between plaintiffs' and defendant's plush 
bears undercuts the similarities between them); Smith v. Weinstein, 578 F. Supp. 1297, 
1304 (S.D.N.Y.), affd mem., 738 F.2d 419 (1984) ("Even assuming that [defendant's 
screenplay] 'Stir Crazy' was written with the [plaintiffs] script in hand, the 'numerous 
differences .... undercut substantial similarity.'"). Of course, sometimes the differ­
ences do not go far enough to eliminate the overall similarity between the works. See, 
e.g., Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982) (changes in facial features and colors used in video 
games were not enough to avoid liability, as "overall similarities not minute differ­
ences" were critical); Ace Novelty Co. v. Superior Toy & Novelty Co., 1984 CoPY­
RIGHT L. R~:P. (CCH) ~ 25,656 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (despite minor differences in parties' 
bears, they are still "almost indistinguishable"); Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. 
v. The Toy Loft, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 174 (N.D. Ga. 1980), affd, 684 F.2d 821 (lith 
Cir. 1982) (introducing differences does not save one from liability for infringement if 
works are still substantially similar). 
In Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983), 
the court addressed the significance of differences added by a defendant in using some 
parts of a protected work. In that case the defendant's character in its television pro­
gram, The Greatest American Hero, allegedly infringed the plaintiffs copyright in the 
Superman character, although there were several personality and physical differences 
between the two characters. The court observed that differences can undermine the 
extent of similarity between works most effectively in visual works where every differ­
ence theoretically eliminates a visual similarity (e.g., a change in color or size). See id. 
at 241-42. In literary works, differences can be added while theoretically retaining all 
the similarities as well (e.g., by adding a paragraph or inserting a chapter). /d. Thus, 
even in making overall comparisons, the courts rely on varying standards to determine 
the degree of copying that will be permitted, depending on the type of work involved. 
See generally Hazen, Contract Principles as a Guide for Protecting Intellectual Prop-
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the defendant's work as a whole be mistaken for or confused with the 
plaintiffs work as a whole ?80 Thus, what may be a substantial similar­
ity because of value in one case, even though it is only a small part of a 
work, may in another case be insubstantial because it is a small amount 
and thus the ordinary observer would not see the overall works as the 
same.81 
erty Rights in Computer Software: The Limits of Copyright Protection, the Evolving 
Concept of Derivative Works, and the Proper Limits of Licensing Arrangements, 20 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 105, 126-27 (1986). 
w This concern with audience confusion is also demonstrated in those cases propos­
ing that a different test for substantial similarity should be applied where the works at 
issue appeal primarily to children, since courts assume that children are less likely than 
adults to notice fine distinctions. For example, in considering whether certain lines used 
in the defendant's Greatest American Hero television show (e.g., "slower than a speed­
ing bullet") infringed the copyright in certain verbal descriptions of the plaintiffs "Su­
perman" character, the court, in Warner Bros. v. American Broadcasting Co., 720 F.2d 
at 244, found no audience confusion, given the comical tones of the defendant's show 
and the timid, bumbling nature of the defendant's character. The court noted, however, 
that "[i]f Hero were a children's series, aired on Saturday mornings among the cartoon 
programs, we would have greater concern for the risk that lines intended to contrast 
Hinckley with Superman might be mistakenly understood to suggest that Hero was a 
Superman program." /d. 
Similarly, in Atari v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982), the court, in comparing two video games, 
noted the importance of the nature of the works and the audiences to which they appeal 
in assessing the impact of differences in expression: 
Video games, unlike an artist's painting or even other audiovisual works, 
appeal to an audience that is fairly undiscriminating insofar as their con­
cern about more subtle differences in artistic expression .... A person 
who is entranced by the play of the game 'would be disposed to overlook' 
many of the minor differences in detail and 'regard their aesthetic appeal 
as the same.' 
/d. at 619 (citation omitted). The court also considered evidence that the defendant's 
game was sometimes referred to by the name of the plaintiffs game as probative of 
substantial similarity. /d. Thus, again, a principal concern was whether the audience 
for the specific works would confuse the defendant's work with the plaintiffs work. 
81 The confusion that surrounds the question of how to define "substantial" is well­
illustrated by a recent Second Circuit case. In Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 
157 (2d Cir. 1986), the plaintiff, executrix of the estate of choreographer George 
Balanchine, alleged that the defendant had infringed Balanchine's copyright in the 
choreography of The Nutcracker ballet by publishing a book containing still photo­
graphs of various scenes from a performance of the ballet. The district court had re­
fused to issue a preliminary injunction, finding no likelihood of success on the merits 
because the ballet as a performance could not be recreated from the still photographs. 
Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1169 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), rev'd, 789 F.2d 157 
(2d Cir. 1986). The court of appeals reversed, holding that the district court had ap­
plied the wrong standard: "Even a small amount of the original, if it is qualitatively 
HeinOnline -- 20 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 744 1986-1987
 
1987] Copyright 745 
4. The Overlap with Fair Use Determinations 
A final problem with the traditional approach to copyright infringe­
ment is the confusing overlap it creates with the fair use doctrine. As 
significant, may be sufficient to be an infringement, although the full original could not 
be recreated from the excerpt." Horgan, 789 F.2d at 162. Thus, the appellate court 
adopted a "value" approach, whereas the district court had followed an "audience con­
fusion" approach, looking at the total work, not simply the excerpt taken. 
Professor Nimmer also recognized that courts used different standards in determining 
substantial similarity, depending on whether the works were characterized by "compre­
hensive nonliteral similarity" as opposed to "fragmented literal similarity." The former 
refers to similarities in the overall structure or pattern of the two works; the latter 
describes cases in which specific portions of the two works are identical or nearly iden­
tical. In determining if the "comprehensive nonliteral similarity" is substantial enough 
to constitute infringement, Professor Nimmer suggests that the courts follow the ap­
proach discussed by Professor Chafee. Professor Chafee's approach compares the spe­
cific patterns used by the plaintiff and the defendant to see if their works are similar 
only in the basic, uncopyrightable level of ideas or whether the defendant has also 
taken much of the plaintiffs specific method of developing and expressing that idea. See 
Chafee, Reflections on the Law of Copyright: I, 45 Cot.uM. L. REv. 503, 513-14 
(1 945}. Professor Nimmer recognizes, however, that courts have been inconsistent in 
defining how much similarity in the overall "pattern" is substantial. 3 M. NIMMER, 
supra note 1, § 13.03[AJ[ 1], at 13-28, 13-29. This inconsistency stems in part from the 
underlying flaw discussed above: The courts do not articulate whether substantial simi­
larity in the patterns is relevant for determining copying or for determining misappro­
priation. Even if it is clear that the issue is misappropriation, there is no objective or 
consistent analytical framework for determining how much of that specific way of de­
veloping a pattern must be__;?aken to infringe the copyright. 
In "fragmented literal similarity," the defendant's work contains an identical or 
nearly identical segment of the plaintiffs expression. Professor Nimmer comments that 
in determining if the amount used should be considered substantial, both quantitative 
and qualitative factors should be considered. However, ultimately the decision "re­
quires a value judgment" reflecting the type of work at issue. 3 M. NIMMER, supra 
note I, § 13.03[AJ[2], at 13-39. Again, he defines no structure in which to make that 
value judgment. Moreover, this focus on value and quantity would seem to indicate that 
only misappropriation and not copying is at issue in cases of "fragmented literal simi­
larity;" this is not necessarily true. Even some precise identity in expression may be 
coincidental. 
Professor Nimmer also comments that ultimately in cases of "fragmented literal simi­
larity," it is necessary to consider not simply the extent of similarity, but also, in the 
context of the doctrine of fair use, the defendant's purpose in using the plaintiffs ex­
pression. 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[AJ[2], at 13-35. As discussed infra in 
text accompanying notes 136-45, in my view it is much wiser to consider all questions 
concerning the value and amount of copying as well as the purpose of the copying in 
the context of fair use. Professor Nimmer would apparently continue to have a "misap­
propriation" factor considered as part of the plaintiffs case in addition to the fair use 
analysis, despite the resulting confusion and duplication. 
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noted above,82 the fair use doctrine has long been available as a defense 
to claims of copyright infringement. Although originally a judicially 
created doctrine, Congress codified the fair use defense in the 197 6 
Copyright Act. Section 107 provides in pertinent part: 
In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular case 
is a fair !!Se the factors to be considered shall include-. . .. 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the 
copyrighted work as a whole . . . .83 
Thus, the extent of similarity between the works is one of the factors 
considered relevant in determining if a use is fair under the 1976 Act. 
The greater the amount of the plaintifrs work that the defendant has 
used, the more difficult it will be to prove that use is fair. Thus, after 
considering the extent of similarities to determine substantial similarity, 
the court must reconsider the extent of similarity between the two 
works in weighing the "amount and substantiality" factor of section 
107. This unnecessarily duplicates the evidence and unduly confuses 
the analysis of similarities.84 
Thus, the use of substantial similarity as determined by the ordinary 
observer presents many conceptual and evidentiary problems. Other ap­
proaches to determining infringement have evolved, but each has con­
ceptual and practical flaws. 
82 See supra text accompanying notes 31-32. 
83 In full, 17 U.S. C. § I 07 ( 1982) provides: 
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copy­
righted work, including such use by reproduction in copies or pho­
norecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes 
such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple 
copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an infringement 
of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any par­
ticular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include -
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such 
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational 
purposes; 
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work; 
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation 
to the copyrighted work as a whole; and 
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work. 
84 Others have criticized this overlap. See Comment, Fair Use, supra note 9, at 79-
80, 105-06; Note, Infringement, supra note 9, at 395. These critics' views are discussed 
in more detail infra at note 143. 
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B. The Salkeld Approach 
In Universal Athletic Sales Co. v. Salkeld,85 the Third Circuit modi­
fied the traditional test for copyright infringement. In effect, the court 
restored the bifurcated analysis described in Arnstein.86 It held that the 
plaintiff alleging copyright infringement first must prove copying and 
then "that copying went so far as to constitute improper appropria­
tion."87 Because in granting the plaintiffs motion for summary judg­
ment the district court made no finding on this second prong, misappro­
priation, the appellate court reversed. 88 
To determine whether there was improper appropriation, the court 
mandated the standard of "whether an ordinary lay observer would de­
tect a substantial similarity between the works."89 As in the traditional 
approach, therefore, substantial similarity was the label used to deter­
mine both copying and improper appropriation. 
The Salkeld test differed, however, in that the court recognized that 
"substantial similarity to show that the original work has been copied 
is not the same as substantial similarity to prove infringement."90 How­
ever, as in Arnstein, the court indicated that although using expert 
analysis and dissection is proper in evaluating similarities to establish 
copying, such analysis IS not appropriate for determining 
misappropriation. 91 
In theory, employing a test based first on an analytical determination 
and then on a visceral determination of substantial similarity was an 
improvement over the traditional approach. This is because the new 
test separated the issues of copying and misappropriation. However, as 
applied, this approach failed to clarify adequately the test for infringe­
ment, because it failed to resolve the problems caused by relying on the 
substantial similarity concept. 
1. Failure to Clarify the Misappropriation Standard 
The Salkeld approach still left entirely undefined just how much 
similarity would constitute misappropriation. In the Salkeld case itself, 
this flaw is obvious. At issue in Salkeld were charts created by both the 
plaintiff and the defendant. The two parties manufactured similar ex-
85 511 F.2d 904 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863 (1975). 
86 154 F.2d 464 (2d Cir. 1946). 
87 Salkeld, 511 F.2d at 907. 
88 See id. 
89 /d. 
90 /d. 
91 See id. 
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ercise machines, and each made a chart using stick figures and textual 
material to explain how to use the machines. The appellate court did 
not disturb the district court's finding of copying, but found the similar­
ities between the two charts insufficient to constitute misappropriation. 
We are left without any clear idea as to why this was not enough, or 
how much would be enough, because the court commented only: 
It is difficult io explain all the points of similarity and dissimilarity be­
tween the two charts without going into great detail. ... [t]he more the 
court is led into the finer points of the drawings, the less likely it is to 
stand upon the firmer, if more naive, ground of its considered impressions 
after its own perusal.92 
In other words, the court was reluctant to give too much guidance be­
cause it preferred an entirely visceral basis for determining misap­
propriation. 
This failure to provide some objective context for defining misappro­
priation has left the Third Circuit district courts as confused as those 
courts using the traditional approach in determining misappropria­
tion.93 For example, in Albert E. Price, Inc. v. Metzner,94 the court 
found substantial similarities between the duck card box manufactured 
by the plaintiff and that made by the defendant: 
If an average person saw the [plaintiffs] duck card box set at a friends' 
[sic] house and then went shopping to purchase such a duck card box, he 
or she would probably buy [defendant's product] and not realize that the 
duck card box which they had purchased was not the duck card box ad­
mired at the friend's house.95 
The court thus seemed to be adhering to the audience confusion ap­
proach for determining misappropriation. 
On the other hand, in Educational Testing Services v. Katzman,96 
the court seemed more concerned with value than audience confusion. 
In that case, the defendant allegedly copied test questions that the 
plaintiff had prepared and used in its standardized examinations. The 
plaintiff claimed that the defendant used the questions in its prepara­
tory course for those examinations. The court found a likelihood of suc­
cess on the merits for the plaintiff despite the defendant's claim that 
only a "handful of questions out of thousands that [the plaintiff] has 
generated" were allegedly copied.97 The court rejected the argument 
92 /d. at 908-09 (footnote omitted). 
93 See supra text accompanying notes 72-81. 
94 574 F. Supp. 281 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
95 /d. at 285, 286. 
96 793 F.2d 533 (3d Cir. 1986). 
97 /d. at 542 (quoting brief of Defendants-Appellants, at 25). 
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that any copying was de minimis because of the "qualitative signifi­
cance" of that copying with respect to the integrity of the plaintiffs 
examinations.98 Thus the court applied the value approach as opposed 
to the audience-confusion approach. 
2. Failure to Resolve Problems Involving the Idea/Expression 
Dichotomy 
Not only does the Salkeld approach fail to address the difficulties 
caused by determining misappropriation on such a loosely defined, sub­
jective basis; it also does not resolve any of the problems existing under 
the traditional approach with respect to the idea-expression dichotomy. 
The ordinary observer is still left with the impossible task of comparing 
only protected expression in determining substantial similarity without 
engaging in any thoughtful dissection or analysis of the works. 
For example, in Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Bandai-America,99 
the court recognized the two separate uses of substantial similarity to 
determine infringement as outlined by the Third Circuit in Salkeld, 
and applied the concept to determine both copying and misappropria­
tion. The court noted that in determining substantial similarity, consid­
ering the idea-expression dichotomy was necessary in deciding the mis­
appropriation issue. 100 In applying that principle, the court rejected the 
defendant's assertion that the physical characteristics of the characters 
appearing in the plaintiffs video game were unprotected ideas: "The 
'idea' of any work could always be defined in such detail that the 
description of the expression would add nothing to the 'idea,' thus al­
lowing a defendant to engage in all but verbatim copying. Such a ploy 
cannot be allowed." 101 
After engaging in this analysis, however, the court refused to grant 
plaintiffs motion for summary judgment. The court held that the issue 
of substantial similarity for appropriation purposes is one for a trier of 
fact, 102 and that summary judgment was thus only appropriate when 
the two works were virtually identical. Thus, ironically, the issue 
would still go back to the jury, which would determine substantial sim­
ilarity on the basis of the ordinary observer test, a generalized visceral 
approach that would not carefully consider the idea-expression 
98 /d. at 542-43. 
99 546 F. Supp. 125 (D.N.J. 1982). 
11"' See id. at 139 n.8. 
101 Jd. at 148. 
1112 See id. at 149. 
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dichotomy. 103 
3. Failure to Separate Copying from Misappropriation 
Even in the area in which it could have improved upon the tradi­
tional approach by separating the issues of copying and misappropria­
tion, the Salkeld approach remains ineffective. Courts still seem to ad­
dress these issues either together in an unfocused way, or by ignoring 
one issue while addressing only the other. For example, in Association 
of American Medical Colleges v. Mikaelian, 104 based on some verbatim 
similarities plus typeface and graphic irregularities that appeared in 
both works, the court found that the defendant had copied the plain­
tifrs test questions. The court concluded that the defendant took ninety 
percent of its questions from the plaintiff. However, the court never 
specifically discussed how much of the plaintifrs work the defendant 
had copied, or why enough similarities existed to infer not only copy­
ing, but also to find misappropriation. Thus, despite the Salkeld out­
line of the test for infringement, the court did not specifically address 
misappropriation. 
On the other hand, in Tompkins Graphics, Inc. v. Zipatone, Inc., 105 
the court considered similarities between the parties' art products, 
which were arrangements of various shapes and designs. Although the 
court recognized that these were common shapes and thus by definition 
had to be similar, it made this observation in the context of deciding 
whether the defendant had copied too much of the plaintifrs work. The 
court noted that only a small proportion of the shapes in the two sets 
were exactly the same in dimensions, and thus that the ordinary ob­
server would not find any "noteworthy similarity." 106 In other words, 
the court jumped to the issue of misappropriation - questioning 
whether the defendant copied too much - without making any finding 
on the primary question - were there enough similarities to infer cop­
ying? Because geometric shapes are common and in the public domain, 
only close similarity in arrangement and dimensions would justify con­
cluding that the defendant copied rather than independently created its 
arrangement. The court's focus on the ordinary observer caused it to 
103 See also Custom Decor, Inc. v. Nautical Crafts, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 154, 157 
(E.D. Pa. 1980) (two sculptures of duck heads considered substantially similar to ordi­
nary observer without any consideration of fact that idea of duck dictates some similari­
ties in expression). 
Hl4 571 F. Supp. 144 (E.D. Pa. 1983), affd mem., 734 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1984). 
105 1984 CoPYRIGHT L. Rt:P. (CCH) 11 25,698 (E.D. Pa. 1983). 
106 /d. at 19,133. 
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miss this issue completely. 
Finally, in Klitzner Industries v. H.K. James & Co., 107 the court 
granted the plaintiff a preliminary injunction, concluding that the 
plaintiff had demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on its in­
fringement claim. The plaintiff argued that the defendant's advertise­
ments for its belt buckles commemorating the Great Seal infringed the 
plaintiffs advertisements for its Great Seal commemorative belt buck­
les. The court considered several parallel textual passages in the two 
advertisements and concluded that the similarities in phrasing, se­
quence, and general content were sufficient to support an inference of 
copying for purposes of the preliminary in junction motion. 108 The court 
recognized that the degree of similarity needed to infer copying was not 
necessarily the same as that needed to find misappropriation, 109 but 
then muddied its reasoning by finding misappropriation because the 
similarities between the advertisements went "beyond mere coincidental 
use of descriptive phrases. " 110 
The probability of coincidence is relevant, however, to the issue of 
copying, since it relates to the likelihood of independent creation. Coin­
cidence is irrelevant in deciding if too much has been copied or misap­
propriated. The extent of copying is determinative of that issue. Al­
though the court did also conclude that the defendant had appropriated 
"virtually the entire text and form" 111 of the protected advertisement, its 
107 535 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. Pa. 1982). 
108 See id. at 1256-57. For example, the plaintiffs advertisement contained the fol­
lowing passage: "Today the eagle continues to soar strong and free over the greatest 
nation the world has ever known." /d. at 1255. In a similar location in the textual 
sequence of its advertisement, the defendant provided this sentence: "Now two hundred 
years later - the eagle continues to soar free and unfettered over the greatest bastion of 
freedom the world has ever known." /d. The parallel phrasing, the use of some identi­
cal words - "the eagle continues to soar strong and . . . over the greatest . . . the 
world has ever known" - and the similar placement in the advertisements are argua­
bly enough to infer copying of the text, even though the similar subject matter would 
create some similarities absent any copying. 
109 See id. at 1256. 
110 /d. 
111 /d. This conclusion is not inevitable. If we return to the passages quoted above in 
note 108, the defendant's use of some different and distinctive words and phrases -
"Now two hundred years later" instead of "Today," and "unfettered" in addition to 
"free," and "bastion of freedom" in place of "nation" - is arguably different enough 
to distinguish the two advertisements and avoid audience confusion and also different 
enough to conclude that the defendant copied only common words and not what was 
truly valuable in the plaintiffs text. 
Also, in Whelan Assoc., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307 
(E.D. Pa. 1985), affd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 877 
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reference to "coincidence" reveals the possibility of some confusion in 
the court's reasoning. 
4. Failure to Eliminate the Overlap with Fair Use 
Finally, the Salkeld approach does not eliminate the duplication in 
considering the extent of similarity between the works, first as part of 
determining substantial similarity and then as a factor in determining 
fair use. A court must still determine the amount of similarity to deter­
mine if copying and misappropriation exist, and then reconsider the 
extent of similarity to evaluate the third factor for determining fair use 
pursuant to section 107 of the 1976 Act. 
Thus, despite the Salkeld approach's potential appeal, it has not re­
solved, either in theory or in application, the ambiguities and confusion 
troubling determinations of copyright infringement. Using "substantial 
similarity" in two different tests only seems to confound the courts even 
more than the traditional approach. 
C. The K rofft Approach 
In 1977, the Ninth Circuit formulated another approach to deter­
mining copyright infringement in Sid & Marty Krofft Television Pro­
ductions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp. 112 The case involved the plaintifPs 
children's television show, H. R. Pufnstuf, which was about an imagi­
nary land peopled by strange fantasy characters, both good and evil. 
The plaintiff claimed that the defendant's McDonaldland advertising 
campaign infringed the copyright in H. R. Pufnstup 13 The court first 
stated the general outline of a case for copyright infringement: access 
(1987), the district court, in comparing two computer programs, failed to apply the 
Salkeld bifurcation of the test of substantial similarity first to determine copying and 
then misappropriation. After discussing the expert's testimony with respect to the simi­
larities, testimony only relevant according to Salkeld to prove copying, the court, with­
out explanation, continued by observing that "prospective users and customers at trade 
shows found no substantial difference between [the two systems] and considered them to 
be the same." /d. at 1322. This observation about audience confusion would be relevant 
to the issue of misappropriation, not copying. The district court thus never separately 
addressed the issues of copying and misappropriation, and as the Third Circuit ob­
served in its review of the district court's decision, "it would thus appear to have con­
travened the law of this circuit." Whelan, 797 F.2d at 1232. However, the Third Cir­
cuit affirmed by adopting and applying a different test for infringement when computer 
programs are at issue. See id. at 488. For a general discussion of computer software 
protection, see Hazen, supra note 79. 
112 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). 
113 /d. at 1162. 
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and substantial similarity. 114 The defendant did not dispute access, as it 
had in fact been negotiating with the plaintiffs for a license to use the 
Pufnstuf characters prior to "creating" their own. 115 The court then 
went on to discuss the need to show substantial similarity. 
The court recognized the flaws with using substantial similarity as 
determined by the ordinary observer test, in particular those flaws re­
lating to the idea-expression dichotomy. It reasoned that using the ordi­
nary observer test to determine substantial similarity without first sepa­
rating the idea from the expression "would produce some untenable 
results." 116 The plaintiff would be able to protect a simple idea simply 
expressed against someone else expressing that idea in an equally sim­
ple way. This is the difficulty presented by the Matte[ case involving 
the crouching, overdeveloped muscular "action figures." 117 The Ninth 
Circuit recognized that the ordinary observer is unlikely to be able to 
separate idea from expression in comparing two works without dissec­
tion or analysis. Therefore, this test would improperly prohibit others 
from copying ideas. 
1. The Extrinsic Test 
Although the Ninth Circuit thus recognized at least one of the flaws 
in the traditional approach, its attempted resolution was equally 
flawed. The court proposed a new two-step test for determining sub­
stantial similarity, once the plaintiff had proven access. First, the test 
compared the works extrinsically for similarities in ideas. Based on spe­
cific criteria, analytic dissection, and expert testimony, the court was to 
determine if the ideas in the two works were substantially similar. The 
court said that the type of artwork, materials, and setting used were 
relevant in applying this extrinsic test. 118 
Unfortunately, the court did not have to apply this test in the case 
before it, because the defendant conceded that it copied its ideas from 
the plaintiff. 119 Moreover, the court did not explain whether determin­
ing substantial similarity of ideas was relevant to determining copying 
114 See id. 
115 See id. at 1161. 
116 /d. at 1162-63. The example used by the court was a plaster statue of a nude: 
"The burden of proof on the plaintiff would be minimal, since most statues of nudes 
would in all probability be substantially similar to the [plaintiffs]." /d. at 1163 (foot­
note omitted). 
11 7 See supm text accompanying notes 68-71. 
118 See Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164. 
119 See id. at 1165. 
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or misappropriation or both. A court can compare and analyze ideas to 
determine if it can infer copying of those ideas, but determining if ex­
pression as well as ideas were copied is still necessary to find copyright 
infringement. Thus, a court must also consider expression analytically 
to decide if it should infer copying as opposed to independent creation 
of that expression. However, as discussed later,1 20 the court rejected us­
ing expert testimony and analysis in comparing the expression of those 
ideas. Thus, the extrinsic test may help to determine if a defendant has 
copied ideas, but the test does not adequately determine copying of pro­
tected expression. 121 
Examining lower courts' attempts to apply the extrinsic test makes 
its problems even more obvious. In Litchfield v. Spielberg, 122 the plain­
tiff sued Steven Spielberg, claiming that his film E. T. infringed the 
plaintiffs copyright in its musical play Lokey from Maldemar. Like 
E. T., the plaintifrs play was about aliens with telekinetic powers who 
are temporarily stranded on earth and then become friendly with some 
children. Although at some basic level these are substantially similar 
ideas, the court looked to the sequence of events, the dialogue, the char-
120 See infra text accompanying note 126. 
121 Professor Nimmer also criticized the Krofft test as an incorrect reading of the first 
step of the Arnstein test. Professor Nimmer suggested that by only comparing ideas, the 
Krofft test "unnecessarily limited the scope of the court's determination under the pre­
liminary, extrinsic test." 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[E], at 13-58. 
Steven Knowles and Ronald Jason Palmieri try to defend the K rofft bifurcated test 
and its allempt to clarify the role of the idea-expression dichotomy in determinations of 
substantial similarity. See Knowles & Palmieri, supra note 9. In order to do so, how­
ever, the authors modify what the court in fact held in K rofft. The authors argue that 
there really is no distinction between an idea and its expression, id. at 124-29, and that 
the first prong of the K rofft test is really a determination of whether there is objective 
as opposed to subjective similarity between the expression used in the two works, id. at 
132-34. The authors suggest that the court intended the use of a detailed, analytical 
comparison of the expression in the two works to see if the defendant used too much of 
tlie essential, original expression used by plaintiff. The authors describe this test as 
applied to Romeo and juliet and West Side Story, indicating that by use of significant 
expert analysis, the court would make this initial, quantitative conclusion. Only then 
would a jury apply the subjective intrinsic test. /d. at 140, 153-66. 
This is not, however, what the Ninth Circuit described in its opinion. The opinion 
called for a separate, extrinsic comparison of ideas and then an intrinsic comparison of 
expression. Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164. Although the authors' approach is interesting, it 
is not the approach described by the court in Krofft. Moreover, the author's approach 
does not address the question of how the issue of copying would be determined, nor 
does it provide a clear definition of where the line should be drawn in applying the first 
test - the extrinsic or objective comparison of expression. 
122 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984 ). 
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acters, and the mood of the works. All of these factors are arguably 
elements of expression. Referring to the K rofft extrinsic test, the court 
found no substantial similarity in ideas. 123 Thus, the court used expres­
sion to compare the ideas and found them dissimilar. Consistent with 
K rofft, the court nowhere indicated whether the insufficiency of the 
similarities in ideas was relevant to the issue of copying or misappro­
priation or both. 
On the other hand, in Universal City Studio, Inc. v. J.A.R. Sales, 
Inc., 124 the owners of the E. T. copyright sued the manufacturers of an 
alien doll that they alleged infringed the copyright in the E. T. charac­
ter. Again, the court applied the Krofft extrinsic test for similarity of 
ideas, and this time found substantial similarity in ideas, i.e., the idea 
of a creature from outer space. 125 Why the court considered these ab­
stract ideas substantially similar in this case while not considering the 
similarities in ideas between the Lokey play and E. T. substantial is un­
clear. Perhaps the court's conclusions with respect to similarities in 
ideas were influenced by the difference in expression of those ideas. 
Perhaps the use of a substantially similar way of expressing the idea of 
the alien is what made the court find the ideas similar in J.A.R., 
whereas in Litchfield, the differences in the way the aliens were de­
picted and- in the stories told about them led the court to conclude that 
these ideas were not similar. In fact, then, the first step in the K rofft 
analysis, the extrinsic test for similar ideas, requires courts to compare 
expression under the guise of comparing ideas. Thus it has not pro­
vided any useful way for distinguishing unprotectable ideas from pro­
tectable expression. 
2. The Intrinsic Test 
The second step in the K rofft approach is also troublesome. The 
Ninth Circuit held that after finding substantial similarity of ideas by 
applying the extrinsic test, the courts should use the ordinary observer's 
responses to evaluate intrinsically the similarities in expression. The 
inquiry must be made without analysis, dissection, or expert testimony, 
but rather must focus on the subjective question of whether the defend­
ant took "so much of what is pleasing to the audience" to be held lia­
ble.126 This is just a fanciful way of stating the old ordinary observer 
123 See id. at 1356-57; see also 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[E], at 13-59 
n.121.9. 
124 1982 CoPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 11 25,460 (C.D. Cal. 1982). 
125 See id. at 17,743. 
126 Krofft, 562 F.2d at 1164, 1165. 
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test for substantial similarity. The courts in the Ninth Circuit, like 
those elsewhere, have had problems applying this test. As in the other 
jurisdictions, sometimes the courts applying K rofft seem to define "sub­
stantial" by focusing on audience confusion, while at other times the 
courts rely more on the value of what the defendant has taken. 
For example, in the K rofft decision itself, the court focused on "the 
impact of the respective works upon the minds and imaginations of 
young people" 127 because these were works directed at children. The 
court concluded: "We do not believe that the ordinary reasonable per­
son, let alone a child, viewing these works will even notice that Pufn­
stuf is wearing a cummerbund while Mayor McCheese is wearing a 
diplomat's sash." 128 The principal concern in determining substantial 
similarity was thus audience confusion. In many cases the courts make 
this decision by simply comparing the "total concept and feel" of the 
works. 129 
By contrast, in Cooling Systems & Flexibles, Inc. v. Stuart Radia­
tor, 130 when the plaintiff argued that the defendant's illustrated radiator 
catalog was substantially similar to its catalog because the ordinary ob­
server would find them "virtually indistinguishable," the court re­
sponded by observing: "This misses the point. What is important is not 
whether there is substantial similarity in the total concept and feel of 
the works ... but whether the very small amount of protectible [sic] 
expression in Cooling System's catalog is substantially similar to the 
equivalent portions of [the defendant's] catalog." 131 The Ninth Circuit 
127 /d. at 1166. 
128 /d. at 1167. 
129 See, e.g., Litchfield, 736 F.2d 1352; Anderson v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 617 
F. Supp. 1 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (screenplays not substantially similar); Overman v. Uni­
versal City Studios, 1984 CoPYRIGHT L. Rt:P. (CCH) 11 25,660 (C.D. Cal. 1984) 
(screenplays not substantially similar); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Film Ventures 
lnt'l, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 1134 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (screenplays substantially similar). 
130 777 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1985). 
131 /d. at 493 (citation omitted). Further, in Eisenman Chemical Co. v. NL Indus­
tries, 595 F. Supp. 141, 146 (D. Nev. 1984), the court found defendant's training man­
ual to be substantially similar to plaintifrs manual because a substantial portion of 
defendant's manual, more than half, was "virtually verbatim" from plaintifrs manual. 
As in Mikaelian, 571 F. Supp. 144, there is no indication in Eisenman as to how much 
of plaintifrs expression had been taken, only how much of defendant's expression re­
sulted from copying. The court was primarily concerned with the "[a]ppropriation of 
another's labor and skill in order to publish a rival work," Eisenman, 595 F. Supp. at 
146, and not with audience reaction to the "total concept and feel" of the two works. 
Thus, in r:isenman the court seemed to be adopting the value approach to 
misappropriation. 
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modified the K rofft intrinsic test to take into consideration the type of 
material allegedly infringed, recognizing that "the fewer the methods of 
expressing an idea, the more the allegedly infringing work must resem­
ble the copyrighted work in order to establish substantial similarity 
•••• " 132 The court never adequately explained, however, how the or­
dinary observer eschewing dissection and analysis could make that 
determination. 
The K rofft test, then, fails to resolve any of the problems presented 
by the traditional approach. The test does not isolate the issue of copy­
ing from the issue of misappropriation; in fact, the two issues are not in 
focus at all. The test still leaves defining the substantive meaning of 
misappropriation to the unpredictable, undefined ordinary observer 
test. The test still confusingly considers the extent of similarity both as 
part of substantial similarity and as part of fair use. Even in the one 
area that the Krofft test could have been potentially helpful -in sepa­
rating the idea from the expression - its unexplained use of an extrin­
sic test to compare the ideas in two works has led courts to define 
"idea" broadly enough to include expression. Thus, courts dissect and 
analyze that "expression" by labelling it an "idea." 133 The failure to 
explain the basis of the two-step inquiry also has caused some to char­
acterize as expression what arguably is simply unprotected idea. 134 
Thus, the ordinary observer is still left poorly equipped to separate the 
protected elements from the unprotected elements of the plaintifrs 
work. 
The K rofft test, the Salkeld test, and the traditional approach are all 
seriously flawed because each relies on the concept of substantial simi­
larity without placing that concept in a definite context in which the 
courts can make objective and consistent determinations of whether the 
degree of similarity between the works at issue is substantial. Each also 
creates an inefficient and confusing overlap with the fair use doctrine. 
m Cooling Sys., 777 F.2d at 49L 
133 See, e.g., Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1356-57 (sequence, dialogue, mood, and charac­
ters compared under extrinsic test for similarity in ideas); Overman v. Universal City 
Studios, 1984 CoPYRIGHT L. Rt:l'. (CCH), at 11 18,958 (plot, character, and tone com­
pared under extrinsic test); Columbia Pictures Industries v. Embassy Pictures, 1982 
CoPYRIGHT L. Rt:l'. (CCH) 11 25,440 (C.D. Cal. 1982) (plots compared as ideas under 
extrinsic test). 
134 In Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1357, as part of its application of the intrinsic test for 
similarity in expression, the court compared the themes of the two works, finding one 
focused on the relationship between the alien and the boy while the other having as its 
theme mankind divided by fear and hatred. It is arguably preferable to consider these 
basic "themes" as underlying ideas and not as expression. 
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III. A NEW TEST 
As we have seen, the real confusion in the various tests for infringe­
ment begins when courts use substantial similarity to determine misap­
propriation. This approach generates problems with distinguishing idea 
from expression, and with deciding whether to focus on the value of 
what was copied or on audience confusion. To reduce this confusion, 
the courts should adopt a new approach to determining copyright 
liability. 
A. The New Approach Described 
1. Proof of Copying 
Under this new approach, a court would first decide if there are any 
similarities between the works. If so, the court would ask whether those 
similarities involve only ideas, or if they involve expression as well. The 
court should not make any determinations based on the amount copied, 
but should be focusing solely on the specific similarities between the 
works, and whether they constitute ideas or expression. 
At this point, the court should engage in the linedrawing described in 
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp. 135 For example, in considering two 
stories about aliens stranded on earth or two crouching musclemen, the 
court would determine if similarities exist beyond the basic idea in 
each, and if those similarities fall on the idea or expression side of the 
copyright dichotomy. This determination would depend in part on the 
commonness of the elements at issue. Thus, a court might consider how 
common it is to write about an alien who eats candy, or to emphasize 
biceps in muscular figures. The determination would also depend on 
whether protecting those elements - in this case candyeating aliens or 
overdeveloped biceps - is consistent with copyright policy.l 36 
135 45 F.2d 119, 121 (2d Cir. 1930). 
136 In fact, courts engage in this type of analysis in cases in which the defendant 
moves for summary judgment, arguing that it has not copied any protectable elements 
of the plaintiffs work. In cases in which courts conclude that no protected expression 
appears in the defendant's work, the court properly enters judgment for the defendant, 
obviating any need for considering the issues of copying or misappropriation. See, e.g., 
Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1982) (summary 
judgment for defendant upheld because two snowmen not substantially similar in ex­
pression); Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir.), cert. de­
nied, 449 U.S. 841 (1 980) (historical interpretation concerning destruction of Hinden­
burg in copyrighted work could be freely used by subsequent authors as it constituted 
an uncopyrightable idea); Zambito v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 613 F. Supp. 1107 
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (screenplay not substantially similar to movie in expression); Pendle-
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If the court finds that any expression, even if just one line of prose, 
for example, appears in· both works, then the trier of fact should next 
determine only whether these similarities resulted from copying. In 
other words, by looking at the universe of possible works and the extent 
of similarity between the two works at issue, the trier of fact, with the 
help of expert testimony, analysis, and dissection, will determine 
whether concluding that the defendant created such similar expression 
by copying from the plaintifrs work is reasonable. 
The degree of similarity needed to support the inference of copying 
will vary, depending on the type of work. For example, similarities in a 
photograph of a famous subject need to be extremely numerous because 
the universe of possible modes of expression is smaller, and thus the 
likelihood of similar works being independently created is greater. 137 
On the other hand, verbatim similarities between two literary works 
need not be as extensive, since the chances that two people would 
choose exactly the same words to express an idea are not as great. 138 
Other similarities, such as similar errors, would also be probative of 
copying. 139 
ton v. /\cuff-Rose Publications, Inc., 605 F. Supp. 477 (M.D. Tenn. 1984) (summary 
judgment for defendant when ideas, but not expression, of songs substantially similar). 
See 3 M. NIMMt:R, supra note 1, § 12.1 0; see also Knowles & Palmieri, supra note 9, 
at 126-31, 138-39 (proposing threshhold determination by court of whether any pro­
tectable expression or only unprotected ideas appear in plaintifrs work). 
137 For example, in Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exch., Inc., 575 
F.2d 62, 65 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978), the court, finding no copying 
of the protected expression in the plaintifrs lifelike painting of a cardinal, observed: 
[I]n the world of fine art, the ease with which a copyright may be deline-
ated may depend on the artist's style. A painter like Monet when dwelling 
upon impressions created by light on the facade of the Rouen Cathedral is 
apt to create a work which can make infringement attempts difficult. On 
the other hand, an artist who produces a rendition with photograph-like 
clarity and accuracy may be hard pressed to prove unlawful copying by 
another who uses the same subject matter and the same technique. 
/d. at 65 (footnote omitted); see also Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 
446 F.2d 738, 741 (9th Cir. 1971) (inference of copying plaintifrs copyrighted bee pin 
"lost much of its strength because both pins were life like representations of a natural 
creature"); cf. Gross v. Seligman, 212 F. 930 (2d Cir. 1914) (copying specific pose of 
model with only insignificant changes infringed copyright in earlier photograph). 
138 See, e.g., Adventures in Good Eating, Inc. v. Best Places to Eat, Inc., 131 F.2d 
809, 811 (7th Cir. 1942) ("strikingly similar" phraseology used in defendant's restau­
rant guide book supports inference of copying); Association of Am. Medical Colleges v. 
Mikaelian, 571 F. Supp. 144 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (repeated exact similarities in test ques­
tions can only be explained by copying). 
139 See, e.g., Eckes v. Card Prices Update, 736 F.2d 859, 863-64 (2d Cir. 1984) 
("numerous common errors" in defendant's and plaintifrs baseball card price guides 
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In assessing the degree of similarity as evidence of copying, the trier 
of fact would also continue to consider evidence of access. If there is 
persuasive evidence of access and motive to copy, such as in Sid & 
Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 140 in which the parties 
had been negotiating the defendant's right to use the protected work, 
then the degree of similarity between the works need not be over­
whelming to find copying. However, if evidence of access is weak, such 
as when the only evidence is some public distribution of the work, then 
the degree of similarity needs to be more significant to infer copying. 141 
If the works are strikingly similar, such as when they are nearly identi­
cal or verbatim or when unique or highly unusual features appear in 
each, then discussing access as a separate issue is not necessary. Rather, 
it can be inferred from these similarities. 142 
Thus, the issue of copying can be determined by an objective test 
looking at evidence of access and substantial similarity in the context of 
the type of works at issue. The use of substantial similarity for this 
purpose appears valuable and workable. 
2. Justification of Copying: Fair Use 
Establishing that copying of some protected expression has taken 
place will make a prima facie showing of copyright infringement. The 
burden should then shift to the defendant to justify that copying by 
proving, under section 107 of the 197 6 Act, that that copying is a fair 
use. Under this approach, the extensiveness of the similarities between 
the two works would be considered part of the fair use analysis. Be-
support inference of copying); Adventures in Good Eating, 131 F.2d at 811-12 (com­
mon errors in telephone numbers and locations supports inference of copying of plain­
tiffs restaurant guidebook); College Entrance Book Co. v. Amsco Book Co., 1 19 F.2d 
874, 875 (2d Cir. 1941) (similar departure by defendant and plaintiff from custom of 
using definite article before words beginning with consonants in French text books sup­
ports inference of copying); see also 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.03[C]. 
140 562 F.2d 1157, 1 161 (9th Cir. 1 977); see also Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assoc., 
293 F. Supp. 130, 135-36 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (defendant tried to secure permission to use 
plaintiffs copyrighted photographs). 
141 See, e.g., Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984) (no access found when song 
performed and distributed to very limited extent); Scott v. WKJG, Inc., 376 F.2d 467 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 832 (1 967) (no access proven when play performed 
only twice and only few copies distributed and no verbatim sentences appeared in de­
fendant's work). See generally 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 1, § 13.02[A], at 13-13, 13-
14. 
142 See, e.g., Heim v. Universal Pictures Co., 154 F.2d 480 (2d Cir. 1946) ("striking 
similarity" between two song compositions); cf Selle, 741 F.2d 896. See generally 3 M. 
NIMMER, supra note I, § 13.02[B]. 
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cause the new test would eliminate the misappropriation element of the 
plaintifrs case, courts would only consider a subjective evaluation of the 
degree of similarity between the two works in the context of fair use. 
Thus, the undesirable duplication and overlap created by considering 
the similarities both as part of the plaintifrs case and as part of the fair 
use defense would be eliminated. 143 
143 Some authors have proposed the opposite approach. For example, in Note, In­
fringement, supra note 9, at 395-96, the author suggested that to avoid duplication, 
courts should incorporate the fourth fair use factor, the effect of the use on the market 
for or value of the copyrighted work, into the audience test for substantial similarity. In 
other words, the ordinary observer test would be used to determine not simply audience 
confusion, but displaced demand as a result of that confusion. Similarly, in Comment, 
Fair Use, supra note 9, at 105-09, the author suggested that the effect on the demand 
for the plaintifrs work be a factor considered as part of the plaintiffs case and not as 
part of the fair use defense. In fact, the author argued that Congress should delete the 
third and fourth factors, i.e., the amount and substantiality factor and the effect of the 
use factor, from the fair use section of the then proposed bill for revision of the copy­
right laws. The author concluded that fair use should be concerned only with the na­
ture of the plaintiffs work and the purpose and character of the defendant's use, and 
that the plaintiff should bear the burden of presenting and proving the substantiality of 
use and the economic impact. Obviously, Congress disagreed with this approach, since 
it enacted the third and fourth factors as part of 17 U.S.C. § 107 and its provisions 
regarding determinations of fair use. 
The Comment also argued that the plaintiff already bears the burden of proving 
damages. Comment, Fair Use, supra note 9, at 106. The author suggested that since 
proof of displaced demand would be an element in proving damages, it makes more 
sense to have all this evidence presented as part of the plaintiffs case. /d. In those 
instances in which displaced demand is an element in the plaintiffs proof of damages, 
this allocation of the burdens might be more efficient. However, there are several flaws 
in this argument. First, the plaintiff is not required to prove damages in order to obtain 
recovery under the 1976 Copyright Revision Act. Section 504(b) provides the copyright 
owner with the right to elect statutory damages in lieu of proof of actual damages and 
profits. As this section's legislative history makes clear, "the plaintiff in an infringement 
suit is not obliged to submit proof of damages and profits and may choose to rely on the 
provision for minimum statutory damages." H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, supra note 5, at 
161. Thus, if a plaintiff did not choose to seek actual damages and profits, the effi­
ciency argument would not follow. Moreover, to impose a burden of proving economic 
injury on the plaintiff in order to prove infringement when Congress has relieved the 
plaintiff of such a burden would violate congressional intent. 
From a broader perspective, it is generally more appropriate to put the burden of 
proving the issue of economic impact on the defendant. Imposing such a burden on 
copyright owners would undermine copyright policy. Copyright is not conditioned on 
the proven economic or aesthetic value of a work. See, e.g., Bleistein v. Donaldson 
Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1902) ("It would be a dangerous undertaking 
for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of 
pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits."). A copy­
righted work of little proven economic value might be copied without any provable 
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The amount used would, however, be only one factor in determining 
fair use. Courts would weigh and consider the other factors outlined in 
section 107 in relation to the amount of the work that the defendant 
has used. The factors under section 107 include: purpose and character 
of the defendant's use, the nature of the copyrighted work, and the ef­
fect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted 
work. 144 Comparing two recent Supreme Court opinions reflecting ap­
plication of the fair use doctrine illustrates how the amount used is a 
variable In those determinations, not an isolated indicator of 
infringement. 
In Sony Corporation of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 145 
the Court concluded that videotaping an entire copyrighted television 
program for private viewing at a later time was a "fair use" of that 
work. Despite assuming that the amount copied was the entire expres­
sion included in the protected work, the Court reasoned that because 
such use did not result in any significant negative impact on "the po­
tential market for or value of the copyrighted work," it is a fair use. 146 
On the other hand, in Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 147 the 
Court found that the defendant's use of only 300 verbatim words out of 
a manuscript containing approximately 200,000 words was not a fair 
use. Despite the relatively small amount of the protected work that the 
defendant had used and the public interest in the material, the Court 
held that because the plaintiff had not yet published its material and 
economic injury. To deny that copyright owner any recovery because no actual injury 
or displaced demand could be shown would be to deny in effect the value of the copy­
right on that work. This would sneak in through the back door what Justice Holmes 
cautioned against in Bleistein. See also Jochnowitz, Proof of Harm: A Dangerous Pre­
requisite for Copyright Protection, 10 CoLUM. J.L. & ARTS 153 (1985) (requiring 
proof of economic harm as prerequisite to recovery would be contrary to copyright 
precedent as well as contrary to public policies underlying copyright law); Ladd, The 
Harm of the Concept of Harm in Copyright, 30 J. CoPYRIGHT Soc'v U.S.A. 421, 422 
(1983) (criticizing increasingly common tendency to view copyright as meant to "extend 
no further than to what is financially indispensable to motivate creation and publica­
tion" and arguing that purpose of copyright is not merely to reward authors, but to 
promote marketplace of ideas and creative expression). 
Moreover, placing the burden of proving economic injury on the plaintiff would not 
necessarily encourage the articulation of reasoning that the fair use doctrine promotes. 
The courts would still be able to reach decisions on the basis of the substantial similar­
ity standards, with all its ambiguity and inconsistency, rather than identifying the real 
factors in their decisions. 
I« 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982). 
145 464 U.S. 417 (1984). 
146 /d. at 450-54. 
147 471 u.s. 539 (1985). 
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had suffered economic injury as a result of the defendant's use, there 
was not fair use. 148 Hence, in one case an extensive use was considered 
fair, whereas in the other the use of only a small amount was consid­
ered unfair. 
The fair use doctrine thus allows the courts to consider the substanti­
ality of the use in a context in which other relevant factors are articu­
lated. If the amount used is slight, but the use has serious impact on the 
plaintiff and is not justified by. any social benefits, a court can find 
liability. 149 However, if the amount used is great, but the use has little 
impact on the market for the protected work, 150 or the nature of the 
work and the defendant's use of that work make it socially desirable to 
promote that use, 151 then a court can find fair use. Similarly, if the 
amount copied is insubstantial and the impact insignificant, fair use 
allows a court to save the defendant from liability, even though some 
copying has occurred. 152 
Critics may argue that applying the fair use doctrine will not make 
determinations of copyright infringement any more predictable than us­
ing the doctrine of substantial similarity. It may be suggested that like 
the test of substantial similarity, the fair use test applies variable facts 
to a nebulous legal standard. This assertion is at least partially true; 
the use of the fair use doctrine would not make the line between liabil-
148 See id. at 560-69. 
149 See Iowa State Univ. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 621 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(no fair use when 8% of film used in way that usurped market for film); Roy Export 
Co. Establishment v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 503 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 
1980), affd, 672 F.2d 1095 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 826 (1982) (no fair use 
when defendant copied 75 seconds from the plaintiffs 72 minute film). 
150 See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. 417; The Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 
F.2d 1345, 1354-55 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affd per curiam, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (photocopy­
ing entire articles is fair use in part because no showing of injury to copyright owners). 
151 See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1354 (photocopying medical journals 
considered fair use in part because of purpose of promoting medical and scientific re­
search); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) 
(copying plaintiffs photographs of Kennedy assassination considered fair use, given in­
significance of injury and the "public interest in having the fullest information available 
on the murder of President Kennedy"). 
152 See, e.g., Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. General Signal Corp., 724 
F.2d 1044, 1050 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984) (no showing of 
likelihood of success on merits for plaintiff when defendant's use of 26 words out of 
2100 in copyrighted article would not "usurp the demand for the [plaintiffs] original 
work"); Triangle Publications, Inc. v. Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc., 626 F.2d 
1171, 1177 (5th Cir. 1980) (fair use defense established when defendant used only 
covers of plaintiffs magazines in way found not to have "any effect - other than 
possibly de minimus - on the commercial value of the copyright"). 
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ity and nonliability absolute or precise. It would still require some eval­
uation of the variables to predict the likelihood of a finding of copyright 
infringement. 
The difference, however, would be that in making that evaluation, 
the specific factors that are appropriate to consider in determining fair 
use are stated openly in the statute 153 and in the case law. 154 Courts 
deciding the fair use issue are guided by the statute explicitly to con­
sider the four section 107 factors, and the opinions thus reveal why a 
certain use of copyrighted material is held to be actionable or not ac­
tionable on the basis of those factors. 155 As we have seen, the courts 
relying on substantial similarity do not necessarily articulate why the 
standard has been met in some cases but not in others. 156 Thus, we 
often do not know why such a determination was made in a particular 
case. Adopting the fair use test would improve the degree of predict­
ability, not by providing a precise standard, but by revealing the real 
reasons underlying a decision so that parties and attorneys evaluating a 
certain use of copyrighted material would know which uses are accept­
able and why. 
B. The New Approach Applied 
Returning to the toy cat hypothetical illustrates the benefits of this 
approach. If we add to the description of the cats some other facts, we 
can compare the results under the old approaches and the new propo­
sal. For example, assume that the plaintiff is an independent craftsper­
son who handmade the toy cats and sold close to two hundred of them 
at crafts fairs in New England for $30 each in 1985. Assume that the 
defendant is a major department store that has been selling its toy cats 
since January 1986, for $25 each, in its branch stores throughout the 
United States, including New England. Assume also that the defendant 
employs buyers to travel to crafts fairs to locate possible new products. 
153 17 U.S.C. § 107 (I 982). 
154 E.g., Harper & Row v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,560-69 (1985); Sony, 464 
U.S. at 448-56. 
l55 Compare, e.g., Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 96-100 (2d Cir. 
1987) (applying and interpreting the four § I 07 factors in concluding that paraphras­
ing of an author's unpublished letters in an unauthorized biography was not fair use) 
with Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253, 1260-64 (2d Cir. 1986) (applying 
and interpreting the four § 107 factors in concluding that the copying of verbatim quo­
tations from plaintiffs book was fair use); see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560-69; 
Sony, 464 U.S. at 448-56; Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796 F.2d 
1148, 1151-56 (9th Cir. 1986). 
156 See supra text accompanying notes 57-134. 
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Given these facts, a court using the traditional approach would prob­
ably be able to infer access from the defendant's practice of sending 
buyers to crafts fairs. The court would then shift to the substantial 
similarity test, using the visceral reactions of the ordinary observer as 
its standard. Applying that standard, one court might conclude that the 
toys are substantially similar because the color and fabric pattern give 
the cats the same overall "touch and feel." A second court might find 
them not to be substantially similar because the change in the gri~ eye 
size, and head size give the toy a different facial expression. Finally, a 
third court might agree with the second court as to overall "touch and 
feel," but might conclude that the colors and fabric pattern were the 
most valuable features and that the defendant had used those features 
in a substantially similar way. The first and third courts would thus 
find substantial similarity, whereas the second would not. 
Unfortunately, this method of decision would not require courts to 
explain their conclusions, nor would it allow us to know whether the 
courts had remembered that the basic idea of a toy cat is not copyright­
able. Moreover, courts would not be forced to consider the possibility of 
independent creation by the defendant in spite of the likely exposure to 
the plaintiffs work. As we have seen, neither the Salkeld approach nor 
the Krofft approach would successfully resolve all these problems ei­
ther, in large part because courts still ultimately determine liability on 
the basis of "substantial similarity" without articulating any basis for 
finding or not finding its presence. 157 
In contrast, the proposed new approach would not allow the court to 
mask its conclusions behind the label of substantial similarity. The 
court would first identify the cats' similarities and determine whether 
any are similarities in expression. Some of these similarities clearly go 
beyond the basic unprotectable idea of a fabric-covered, stuffed toy cat. 
The coloring and the fabric pattern used on the toy are similarities in 
expression not dictated by the idea of a toy cat. 
The court would then consider the likelihood that the defendant, 
having had the opportunity to see the plaintiffs work, could have inde­
pendently decided to use the same unusual colors and fabric pattern. 
This determination would perhaps rest on expert testimony as to the 
universe of possibilities and past and current practice. If the court con­
cluded that the use of these colors and fabric patterns was copying, the 
plaintiff would have successfully demonstrated that the copying was of 
protected expression. Having proven the initial element of opportunity 
157 See supra text accompanying notes 85-134. 
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to see the work (access), and copying of protected expression (substan­
tial similarity), the plaintiff would have established a prima facie case 
of copyright infringement. 
The burden would now shift to the defendant to justify that copying 
as a fair use. The court would consider the extent of copying in terms 
of the effect it would have on the plaintiff. In our hypothetical, this 
impact could be devastating: the defendant is mass producing cheaper 
cats and selling them in New England. If the defendant's cat is so much 
like the plaintiffs cat as to supplant sales of the plaintiffs cat, the de­
fendant could not establish fair use. If, however, the cats are different 
enough that most buyers would still purchase plaintiffs handmade ver­
sion, the defendant might establish fair use. 
Tied in with these factors, however, could also be facts relating to 
public interest or the defendant's good faith or charitable intentions. 
For example, imagine the defendant were a craftsperson who hand­
made the toy cats after seeing them at a plaintiff department store. If 
the defendant then sold the cats for charitable purposes or gave them 
away as gifts, the court might find fair use even though the similarities 
between the toy cats were substantial enough to cause some consumers 
to buy the defendant's cat instead of buying the plaintiffs copyrighted 
version. In reaching these decisions, the court would consider the fac­
tors defined in section 107, and would justify its conclusion by articu­
lating how it weighed the factors. 
Fair use in this way provides a mechanism for balancing the amount 
of copying with other important factors. In contrast, the ambiguous and 
confusing notions of substantial similarity allow the courts to use seem­
ingly arbitrary lines, masking the real reasons for their decisions. Re­
vealing the true basis for judicial decisions would provide a higher de-
gree of predictability, integrity, and accountability. · 
CONCLUSION 
The traditional approach to determining copyright infringement, and 
the modifications thus far attempted, are all seriously inadequate. Each 
relies in part on the concept of substantial similarity as determined by 
the ordinary observer. As we have seen, this concept cannot be used 
effectively to determine infringement because (1) it rejects the expert 
testimony and analysis necessary to determine if copying can be in­
ferred; (2) it tends to blur the line between unprotected idea and pro­
tected expression; and (3) it does not define when similarity is substan­
tial, i.e., do we use audience confusion or some other measure tied to 
the value of the material being used? Despite years of trying to define 
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and refine this concept of substantial similarity, it remains a confused, 
ambiguous, and unhelpful concept which enables courts to obscure the 
real reasons behind their decisions. 
Courts should therefore adopt a new approach to determine copy­
right infringement. Courts initially should consider as a matter of law 
whether any protected expression appears in both works or only unpro­
tected ideas. The plaintiff then should prove that the defendant has in 
fact copied that expression. To do this the plaintiff should present evi­
dence of access and of any similarities between the accused work and 
the plaintiffs work. This evidence should be examined, dissected, and 
analyzed to determine objectively whether it should be inferred that the 
defendant copied from the plaintiff and did not create its work indepen­
dently. If the defendant has copied some protected expression, the bur­
den should then shift to the defendant to demonstrate fair use. The 
amount copied is a factor to be considered, but only one factor. The 
parties and the court should analyze thoroughly the question of fair 
use, using all relevant factors and articulating how it weighed those 
factors in reaching its decision. 
Such an approach would preserve the integrity of the copyright laws 
by providing a workable framework for deciding copyright cases. 
Moreover, by deciding such cases in this way, the courts can avoid 
strained and inconsistent results, and can better serve the public. 
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